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Undoubtedly, the Four Modernisations launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 broadly succeeded 
in transforming China from an impoverished agricultural economy to the major world power 
we know today. Poverty levels were substantially reduced, and the resulting economic growth 
was astonishing. Notwithstanding, some academics note that this expansion left some segments 
of society behind and eventually created a significant social gap. This research paper offers a 
synopsis of the evolution of both poverty and inequality in the post-reform period, as well as a 
general introduction to the main disparities present in Chinese society – the rural-urban divide, 
the inland-coastal gap, the unequal educational opportunity, and the detrimental effects derived 
from the demographic change and the population dynamics. 
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Sens dubte, les Quatre Modernitzacions impulsades per Deng Xiaoping el 1978 van aconseguir 
transformar la Xina d’una societat principalment agrària i empobrida a la potència mundial que 
coneixem avui en dia. La pobresa es va reduir de forma significativa i el creixement econòmic 
va ser espectacular. De totes maneres, nombrosos acadèmics indiquen que aquesta expansió va 
deixar enrere certs segments de la població, creant finalment una profunda bretxa social. Aquest 
document de recerca ofereix una sinopsi de l’evolució de la pobresa i la desigualtat al llarg del 
període post-reforma, així com una introducció general a les principals disparitats presents en 
la societat xinesa – l’escletxa urbana-rural, l’escletxa interior-costanera, l’accés desigual a les 
oportunitats educatives, i la influència negativa del canvi demogràfic i la dinàmica poblacional. 
 
Paraules Clau: Xina, Quatre Modernitzacions, Creixement Econòmic, Desenvolupament 
Social, Desigualtat, Pobresa, Escletxa Urbana-Rural, Escletxa Interior-Costanera. 
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1. Rationale for this Thesis 
China is commonly deemed to be one of the major emerging markets, and over the last decades 
has become a global economic powerhouse capable of competing in the international arena. Put 
differently, the nation has experienced a truly exceptional economic progress. Notwithstanding, 
several scholars often ignore whether the 1978 reforms have been successful in achieving high, 
equitable growth, or if they have left some segments of society behind – they consider the state 
as a whole, and do not examine each of its different “parts”. This fact, together with my passion 
for political and social issues, has pushed me to explore to what extent inequality and poverty 
are present in Chinese society, as well as the tendency followed by these phenomena in recent 
years. 
This subject area is highly relevant to my field of study, International Business. The astonishing 
economic expansion has granted the nation a key role in global commercial transactions. China 
is currently regarded as having achieved the status of major player in international commerce 
and presents endless opportunities for investment and business growth. It must be pointed out, 
however, that economic development is closely linked to social development – a high incidence 
of poverty or inequality could eventually weaken the economic performance of the country and 
scare off potential investors. Therefore, this is a complex matter that deserves further attention. 
 
2. Statement of the Problem 
The starting point of this thesis is the 1978 “reform and opening-up” policy envisioned by the 
Communist Party of China, then led by Deng Xiaoping. This economic programme incredibly 
transformed society and “opened the door” to foreign enterprises that wanted to establish in the 
country. The outstanding economic growth and the increase in the nation’s wealth were likewise 
accompanied by a reduction of poverty rates within China. Nonetheless, these series of reforms 
also triggered serious adverse effects. Inequality levels rose significantly and have continued to 
increase in recent years, challenging the country’s sustainable development and setting different 
living standards among its citizens on the basis of countless and diverse factors. 
The goal of this paper is to analyse the most common trends on inequality and poverty, together 
with their root causes and their potential leverage on the economy. Social development will be 
studied first on a nationwide basis, and the most significant traits will be subsequently disclosed 
and further examined. Possible policy reforms will be briefly discussed as a concluding remark. 
 
3. Hypothesis, Objectives and Research Methodology 
This document departs from the hypothesis that the deep economic reforms executed under the 
leadership of Deng Xiaoping, by which the nation transitioned from a centrally-planned system 






behind. Despite being highly successful in reducing poverty and speeding up the state’s growth, 
the new economic model exacerbated inequality. Owing to the 1978 programme characteristics, 
individuals living in areas in which the productive and commercial activities of the country are 
located enjoyed a much greater improvement in their living standards. Those residing in other 
parts of China, conversely, only experienced quite modest progress. This eventually resulted in 
the emergence of considerable disparities among its inhabitants. This criterion will be subject 
to throughout scrutiny in this paper. Following are the primary objectives of this research study:  
▪ To identify the specifics of the 1978 reform and the crucial factors that led to its success, 
together with the possible impact social unrest had on its implementation. 
▪ To examine the economic growth experienced by China as a result of the 1978 reform. 
▪ To find out the actual magnitude of poverty and inequality in the post-reform China. 
▪ To analyse the most significant trends in poverty and inequality, alongside their major 
causatives and their plausible effect on the economy. 
▪ To uncover the relationship between economic growth and both poverty and inequality. 
▪ To briefly discuss, as a concluding observation, distinct policies that could be possibly 
adopted by the administration to cope with this problematic. 
The research methodology employed to conduct this paper primarily relies on the review of the 
extensive literature on the subject and the examination of already published data. Information 
has been gathered from alternative authors and sources with the purpose of comprehending the 
degree of progress made in China, along with its determinants and the influence it exerts on the 
economy. On the one side, the empirical research of reputed academics and scholars has been 
employed to determine the pattern that income inequality is expected to follow as an economy 
prospers. On the other, different indicators of development have been collected from multiple 
institutions, at both the national and international level, to provide a more trustworthy portrait 
of the incidence of this problematic. These include, for instance, the World Bank and the NBSC. 
 
4. Structure of the Thesis 
With the aim of addressing the issue previously described, this composition is divided into two 
chief chapters. Each, in turn, contains several sections to better discuss and comprehend the real 
magnitude of the chosen theme. 
▪ The First chapter deals with the 1978 “reform and opening-up” policy. The performance 
of the Chinese economy both before and after the plan will be analysed, as well as the 
potential influence that the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests had on its implementation. 
▪ The Second chapter is devoted to assessing the general trends of poverty and inequality 
in contemporary China, together with their root causes and consequences on economic 
growth. In addition, previous literature on the area – including the empirical studies of 
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1. A Glimpse of China’s Economy Prior to Reforms 
After the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, China’s economy was significantly 
debilitated as a result of the warfare that hit the country over the previous decades. Countless 
mines and factories were either damaged or destroyed, Soviet troops dismantled a considerable 
portion of machinery in the major industrial areas of the north-east and dispatched them to the 
Soviet Union, and agriculture suffered from a severe disruption (Worden et al., 1988). Besides, 
as Chang (1958) pointed out, the nation underwent a hyperinflation in which prices were up by 
more than a thousand times. Hence, the prime objective for the Communist government was to 
prompt the reconstruction and consolidation of the economy. The administration implemented 
multiple policies to reach this ambitious target. A nationwide land reform program was enforced 
with the aim of confiscating and redistributing the titles to about 45 per cent of the arable land 
from rural landlords to peasants, who were then prompted to cooperate with each other through 
“mutual aid teams”. Additional property expropriations were enacted, resulting in the end of 
the influence of many tycoons and the formation of a basis for the upcoming industrialization. 
The recovery strategy was successfully completed by 1952, when price stability was restored, 
trade was revived, and both agriculture and industry retrieved their previous production levels. 
Mao Zedong, who was serving as Chairman at that time, pursued a centrally planned economy 
largely based on the Soviet model – a large portion of the economic output was instructed and 
managed by the executive, which was also responsible for setting production goals, controlling 
prices and directing resource allocation (Morrison, 2019). A series of economic reforms were 
executed to achieve economic growth in what has been regarded as “one of the largest economic 
policy experiments and development programs in modern history” (Cheremukhin et al., 2015). 
However, the policies enforced before 1978 are commonly believed to have kept the economy 
extremely poor, stagnant, inefficient, and isolated from the outside world. 
 
According to Chinese government statistics, the country’s real GDP (see Figure 1a) grew at an 
average rate of 6.7 percent per year for the period 1953-78. The reliability of this data, however, 
has commonly been discussed by innumerable researchers who believe production levels have 
frequently been overstated on account of manifold political reasons. Angus Maddison (2007) 
deems the actual GDP growth to be at an annual 4.4 percent. Real per capita GDP (see Figure 
Figure 1. (A) GDP (¥100 Million) and (B) Per Capita GDP (¥), 1952–78 
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1b), in turn, grew at a modest annual average rate of 3 percent. As hinted by Zhu (2012), the 
primary source of economic growth for the aforementioned period was capital accumulation. It 
is also important to highlight this was a period rather tumultuous for the nation as a whole – the 
Great Leap Forward (1958-60) resulted in a terrible famine that allegedly caused the deaths of 
tens of millions of individuals, and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) sparked a political chaos 
that eventually led to the disruption of the economy. 
To better comprehend the fluctuations the economy suffered during this interval, three pivotal 
events that hit the Chinese society and, therefore, its economic growth will be briefly examined. 
1.1. The First Five-Year Plan (1953–57) 
Once conditions of economic stability 
had been achieved, the administration 
strongly committed to ensuring a swift 
industrialisation. The project, known as 
the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57), was 
largely inspired in the Soviet economic 
model and relied on the belief that a 
raised investment in heavy industries as 
steel, concrete, and heavy machineries 
would ultimately speed up the whole 
industrialization process. The aim, as pointed out by Lewis et al. (2020) was to assemble “large, 
sophisticated, and highly capital-intensive plants”, somewhat at the expense of the other sectors. 
In spite of the strong emphasis on the industry sector, agriculture also underwent a profound 
transformation for the purpose of maximising efficiency, easing the mobilisation of agricultural 
resources, and expanding the government access to farming products. Peasants were prompted 
to organise first into small collectives comprising between 20 to 30 households, and eventually 
into advanced cooperatives in which they were allowed to own their house, a cattle, a private 
plot and their own savings – by 1956, collectivisation levels reached those of the Soviet Union. 
As suggested by Worden et al. (1988), industrial production grew at an average annual rate of 
19 percent within this period, whereas agricultural output increased by about 4 percent per year 
(see Figure 2). National income likewise raised at a yearly rate of 9 percent from 1953 to 1957. 
1.2. The Great Leap Forward (1958–60) 
As disparities between industrial and agricultural growth, abundant inefficiencies, and a lack of 
flexibility in the decision-making process started to become evident, authorities soon began to 
accept that the Soviet-based pattern of economic development did not properly suit the country. 
Instead, the government opted to launch the Great Leap strategy with the aim of turning China 
Figure 2. Value-Added by Activity (¥100 Million), 1953–57 
 
Source: Own Work Based on NBSC Data. 
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from a predominantly agrarian society 
into a major industrial power capable of 
competing with Western industrialized 
nations by benefitting from its massive 
labour surplus. Altogether, the proposal 
was focused on two fundamental goals: 
a comprehensive industrialization and a 
deep reorganisation of rural production. 
Advanced cooperatives were pressed to 
reconstitute into people’s communes, which seized the ownership rights of all those assets that 
could be used in production and were responsible for the arrangement and decision-making of 
agricultural activities. These massive rural units were ideally envisioned to maximise yielding, 
boost local industrial production, provide better opportunities for rural schooling, and shape a 
local militia force. In practice, they destroyed the working incentives of peasants, who were not 
encouraged to produce beyond state quotas, and failed to lead to a notable growth in output and 
productivity (Aglietta and Bai, 2012). This contingency sparked the Great Chinese Famine, in 
which official data admit to 15 million deaths and unofficial estimates suggest up to 45 million. 
The Great Leap Forward had disastrous results on the economy. In 1959 and 1960, as disclosed 
by Worden et al. (1988), the gross value of agricultural output dropped by 14 percent and 13 
percent, respectively (see Figure 3). Besides, living standards are believed to have declined by 
20.3 percent as a consequence of this particularly devastating economic stage (Morrison, 2019). 
1.3. The Cultural Revolution (1966–76) 
As opposed to the preceding schemes, 
the Cultural Revolution did not spawn 
a new economic model. It was rather a 
mass political movement to strengthen 
Mao’s personality cult and preserve the 
Communist ideology by destroying the 
capitalist and traditional elements still 
present in the Chinese society. Events 
escalated rapidly as students, with the 
support of the Chairman, commenced 
to harass members of the elderly and intellectual community through the paramilitary groups 
known as Red Guards. Although the rebellion was called to a halt in 1968, it continued under 
further phases until Mao’s death in 1976. The riot resulted in a death toll ranging from 500,000 
to 2 million individuals and severely disrupted China’s economy, particularly in its early phase. 
Figure 3. Value-Added by Activity (¥100 Million), 1958–60 
 
Source: Own Work Based on NBSC Data. 
Figure 4. Value-Added by Activity (¥100 Million), 1966–76 
 
Source: Own Work Based on NBSC Data. 
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As a means of illustration, Worden et al. (1988) highlighted that industrial production declined 
by 14 percent in 1967 (see Figure 4), whereas the output of 1968 fell by 12 percent below that 
of 1966. The phase spanning from 1966 to 1968 additionally saw a drop in living standards of 
9.6 percent (Morrison, 2019). 
 
2. Reform and Development Strategy 
The economic policies undertaken under Mao’s leadership introduced a series of distortions in 
the economy. Since most aspects were centrally coordinated and supervised, the result was a 
lack of market mechanisms that, in turn, led to a large misallocation of resources and an absence 
of initiatives to become more productive or to manufacture a higher quality outcome. Instead, 
businesses, workers, and farmers solely produced those quantities set by the authorities, hence 
operating within its set of production possibilities and creating a large potential but unrealized 
output. Overall, the period 1952-78 witnessed a descending aggregate productivity, constant 
food crises and a modest enhancement of living standards. Nevertheless, as Brandt and Rawski 
(2008) hinted, it must be noted that illiteracy dropped from 80 percent to 16.4 percent within 
this interval thanks to the creation of village schools, while health standards likewise improved 
because of the contribution of “barefoot doctors” to the medical services for rural communities. 
Given that China had failed to reach the stage of development attained not only by the Western 
industrialized nations but also by other authoritarian states such as Singapore, Taiwan and South 
Korea, a change in strategy seemed inevitable. Hence, after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 
and the subsequent end of the Cultural Revolution, a series of economic reforms began to take 
place in a gradual, incremental, decentralized manner – policies were first implemented on an 
experimental basis in some areas before being eventually applied to the whole country as a way 
of minimizing the possible disruption they might occasion. Deng Xiaoping, who took power in 
1978, intended not to conclude communism but to enhance it through the introduction of market 
mechanisms and the reduction (but not withdrawal) of government intervention in the economy. 
As Naughton (2008) clarified, 
during the economic transformation, the Communist Party hierarchy did not sit off to one side, frozen in 
time while everything else in China changed. Rather, the hierarchical political system shaped the process 
of market transition, and the political hierarchy itself has been reshaped in response to the forces 
unleashed by the economic transition. 
The Four Modernisations – of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and defence –, first 
developed in the 1960s by Zhou Enlai, were put at the top of the nation’s agenda with the hope 
of increasing economic growth and raising living standards. The ultimate purpose was to turn 
China into a fairly modern nation by the end of the 20th century, which in practice signified the 
inception of a “socialist market economy” that combined government planned decisions with 
capitalist features. A wide-scale political reform, however, was not embraced by the Chairman. 
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Agriculture, a field historically mismanaged by Communist leaders, constituted a critical first 
step. The main inspiration behind Deng’s rural reform is found in a local experiment in Anhui 
province, in which land was leased to each family in return for delivering quotas assigned under 
the central plan. Each member household, now responsible for the management of a given share 
of the commune, had the free will to select the crop it wanted to grow. Upon fulfilment of the 
quota, the sale of extra output on the free market was permitted and, hence, families could either 
entirely benefit from the gains or suffer from any possible loss on their own. No one was made 
economically worse under this contract: the commune was still able to dispatch the government-
imposed quota and households were not forced to produce beyond this target (Lau and Zheng, 
2015). In less than a year, farmers’ yield was large enough not only to cover their own needs, 
but also to be put for sale at market-determined prices. This successful organization approach 
rapidly spread across the country until being eventually adopted nationwide in the early 1980s. 
As Lin (1992) noted, the transition from the collective system to the household responsibility 
system started in 1979 and was fundamentally concluded by the end of 1983. The abolition of 
the communes signed the beginning of a “dual-track” economy in which both free markets and 
mandatory central plans coexist and completely revived the Chinese agriculture – it generated 
incentives for production as it gave peasants the freedom to administer their land and effectively 
linked rewards with their performance (Chen and Davis, 1998). As a means of illustration, the 
annual output during the commune-era ranged from 30 to 50 billion kilograms, but by 1984 this 
figure rose to 400 billion kilograms. It must be said, nevertheless, that the system was locally 
implemented with notable variance as a result of the inability of the central administration to 
supervise local authorities and the lack of effective means for rural individuals to defend their 
rights (Vendryes, 2010). 
Changes were also implemented in industry in an effort to shift from a model in which resource 
allocation was mostly dictated by planning and administrative directives to one guided by the 
interaction of autonomous, competitive, profit-oriented economic agents in the market (Perkins, 
1988). Under this marketisation strategy, as Byrd (1992) emphasised, “government supervision 
was to be […] oriented toward economic rationality”. As in agriculture, experiments were first 
performed on a small scale before spreading throughout the whole country – the pilot test was 
originally carried out in Sichuan province and eventually proved to be a success, since the 6,600 
state-owned enterprises on which these reforms were applied ended up manufacturing about 45 
percent of the total industrial output of the nation (Chow, 2002). 
Overall, three major adjustments were applied to the sector. First, state-owned companies were 
granted autonomy in production, marketing, and investment decision-making, thereafter being 
released from the demands of state planning. Secondly, they were made financially independent 
by enabling them to retain, after payment of state taxes, the earnings as their own profits. Lastly, 
firms put into effect a contract responsibility system comparable to the household responsibility 
system in agriculture. It allowed them to keep above-quota profits for distribution to its workers 
and for capital investment and provided a remarkable flexibility in the face of market or other 
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shocks (Byrd, 1992). In addition, the government ceased ownership of small and medium-sized 
firms by issuing shares that were typically purchased by its managers and staff, hence providing 
both an infusion of capital to the venture and substantial motivation to its labourers, who now 
shared part of the profits. Most of the large state-owned companies, in turn, were transformed 
into shareholding enterprises in which the executive controlled the majority of shares. In spite 
of introducing certain inefficiencies on their own, reforms pushed up the total amount of profits 
kept by national firms from ¥2 billion in 1978 to ¥10 billion in 1980 (World Bank, 1988). These 
increased funds were subsequently employed to finance employee’s housing, public facilities, 
and welfare, which greatly contributed to the outstanding improvement of their living standards. 
The Chairman firmly believed that the stimulation and support of foreign trade and investment 
was essential to modernize China’s science and technology, revamp its industry, and ultimately 
boost the entire economy. This conviction led to the launch of a new plan, known as the Open-
Door Policy, intended to “open the door” to foreign businesses that were willing to invest in the 
country. In consequence, Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were instituted with the purpose of 
drawing in foreign investment, stimulating exports, and importing high technology equipment. 
They were characterised, as reported by Crane et al. (2018), by “a defined geographical area, 
local management, unique benefits, and separate customs and administrative procedures”. Put 
in other words, these areas were authorised to experiment with market mechanisms and release 
themselves from the direction and guidance of the central administration. They were expected 
to eventually fuel economic development by supplying low-cost labour to foreign investors and 
prompting mass exportation. The first four SEZs were set up in 1980 in south-eastern coastal 
China and encompassed the then small cities of Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou (in Guangdong 
province), and Xiamen (in Fujian province). As Yongning (2009) stressed, these geographical 
areas were selected because of their strategic location adjacent to “anticipated sources of foreign 
capital” – Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. Indeed, they offered an advantageous tax regime 
and low wages to bring capital and tempt businesses from these regions. 
The real GDP growth in the communities where SEZs were put into effect was extraordinarily 
high: while the Chinese economy grew at an average rate of 9.6 percent per year over the period 
1981-93, Shenzhen expanded at an impressive annual average rate of 40 percent (Ge, 1999). In 
addition, its population grew from about 52,000 in 1979 to more than 1,000,000 by 1993. This 
astonishing progress, as Ge (1999) explained, was nevertheless derived from the poor economic 
base these cities presented before the implementation of this policy and proved unsustainable 
on the long-term. SEZs succeeded in attracting international capital, technology, and technical 
and managerial expertise, and dramatically changed those territories in which they were located. 
This ultimately persuaded the executive to further expand this status to other parts of the nation, 
including fourteen coastal cities, the Hainan province, some major cities in inland China, and 
multiple areas along both the border and the Yangtze River. It must be noted, though, that SEZs 
contributed to the increase in the disparity gap between regions. They were expected to exercise 
a “spillover effect” where the expansion achieved in coastal regions would sequentially spread 
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to central and western China (Litwack and Qian, 1998). Unfortunately, as Gross (1988) stated, 
the aforementioned effect did not materialise, and regional discrepancies were widened instead. 
Defence was the last field to undergo modernization, but it is of minor relevance for the purpose 
of this paper. In brief, the reform of the People’s Liberation Army was primarily based on three 
courses of action (Sahay, 2016). First, the military was to be disengaged from civilian politics 
to guarantee the political stability that characterised the pre-Cultural Revolution era. Secondly, 
with the intention of enhancing combat effectiveness of the armed forces, the executive revised 
its organisational structure, education and training, and personnel policies. Lastly, efforts were 
focused on reorganising the defence R&D and industrial base to attain a modern military force. 
Further changes were also adopted in other parts of the economy – including the price system, 
the banking and financial sector, and the social welfare system – to support the modernisations. 
 
3. Social Unrest: the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests 
The upheaval exhibited at Tiananmen Square in 1989 was, as Davis and Vogel (1990) indicated, 
a product of the social consequences of the economic reforms initiated under the leadership of 
Deng Xiaoping. Indeed, student-led demonstrations began to gain momentum after the end of 
the Cultural Revolution, and were intended to compel the executive to implement democratic 
structures that would eventually enable Chinese individuals to actively participate in decision-
making – examples can be found in Tiananmen Square, in 1976; the Democracy Wall, in 1978, 
and Hefei, in 1986. The so-called “Fifth Modernization” (democracy) was, nonetheless, never 
contemplated for the 1978 plan. The administration rather justified its decision by accentuating 
the distinction between the intellectual and cultural aspects of the Western economies and their 
technological and scientific accomplishments, but the precepts of capitalist countries certainly 
penetrated China. As highly trained technical personnel returned from abroad, where they were 
sent to receive advanced education, a collection of new ideas and influences reached the society 
and ultimately fuelled the 1989 events (Spence, 1990). Overall, as highlighted by Zhao (2001), 
the movement was characterised by “frequent government policy changes back and force from 
concession to repression, quick and successful participant mobilisations, and the dominance of 
traditional forms of language and action”. 
The death of Hu Yaobang, a Communist party leader who aimed to make the government more 
transparent, acted as a catalyst for the Protests. Pro-democracy demonstrators, mostly students, 
peacefully gathered on the day of his funeral to call for a more open, democratic, fair system. 
In the following weeks, they were overwhelmingly joined by tens of thousands of individuals 
that occupied Beijing’s Tiananmen Square and around 400 other cities nationwide to transmit 
a solid message to the Communist Party: the population petitioned an end to both corruption 
within the administration and unbridled inflation, the enforcement of democratic reforms, and 
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(1990), is that a number of these demands were in fact included in the Constitution that the own 
Party designed but were never actually permitted. It must be noted, though, that the movement 
soon became complex, convoluted, and sometimes contradictory as a result of the astonishing 
expansion of participation (Odgen et al., 1992). 
Given the rapid expansion of dissidence throughout the country, the executive increasingly saw 
both its legitimacy and its position in power threatened. Indeed, the 1989 events were the largest 
spontaneous mass movement since the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949. As 
Béja (2011) underlined, this unprecedented movement caused an intense debate among party 
officials. Moderates, such as Zhao Ziyang, defended negotiating with the students and offering 
concessions; but the Chairman could not accept this standpoint and insisted instead on violently 
repressing the demonstrations. Along these lines, martial law was declared on May 20 and up 
to 300,000 army troops were mobilized to the capital. There they encountered tens of thousands 
of Beijing citizens, who flooded the streets and successfully prevented them from advancing. 
Troops were finally called to withdraw on May 24, but that did not translate into the end of the 
government’s response to the incidents. In the early morning hours of June 4, tanks and heavily 
armed soldiers forcibly moved towards Tiananmen Square, the hub of the protests, slaughtering 
those who attempted to stop them. By June 5, the movement had been essentially suppressed in 
what has been constantly qualified as a “massacre” (See Figure 5). Authorities additionally 
arrested innumerable suspected dissidents, employed analogous military tactics in several other 
Chinese cities, expelled foreign journalists, ensured a stern control over the domestic media’s 
coverage of the events, and purged sympathisers of the uprising within the Party (Miles, 1997). 
 
The death toll has remained under discussion since the end of the occurrence. As announced by 
the executive’s spokesman Yuan Mu, the official count of those killed was 241 – including both 
civilians and soldiers –, along with 7,000 wounded. The Chinese Red Cross, however, initially 
estimated 2,600, a figure that soon disclaimed given the intense pressure from the government 
(Yang and Wagner, 1990). Yet, according to The Impact of the Tiananmen Crisis on China’s 
Economic Transition (Naughton, 2009), the events did not have a large impact on the Chinese 
economy. The fundamental distinction between the pre- and post-Tiananmen period lies in the 
shift in the Party’s priorities. Before the crisis, political leaders subordinated national interests 
to the economic reform in an effort to pursuit a better economy and society. After, alternatively, 
Figure 5. Authorities’ Response to the 1989 Protests 
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the ambition of a revamped economy was put below the authorities’ desire for a strengthened, 
stabilised, and more effective government power. The most direct effect of this shift is found 
in both the provision of public goods and growth-oriented public investment (Naughton, 2009). 
 
4. Economic Performance in the Post-Reform China 
Since 1978, China has undergone a certainly exceptional economic transformation. It is beyond 
doubt that Deng Xiaoping’s Four Modernisations broadly succeeded in transitioning the nation 
from a centrally planned system to a more market-oriented economy, ultimately leading to an 
astonishing economic growth. Indeed, as Kong et al. (2012) indicated, the relaxation of state 
control over the economy, the creation of market incentives, the support for private businesses, 
the curtailment of protectionist policies, and the market opening unquestionably improved the 
efficiency of the economy. Only the events of 1989 succeeded to disrupt this path of substantial 
expansion – multiple countries imposed trade sanctions against China, and economic reforms 
were put on hold. Real GDP growth rate consequently decreased from 11.3 percent in 1988 to 
4.2 percent in 1989, and further fell to 3.9 percent in 1990 (Morrison, 2019). But, as mentioned 
in the previous section, the economic slowdown did not have a long-term effect on the market: 
in 1991 foreign sanctions were either reduced or removed and reforms resumed. This significant 
progress has allowed the nation to become the second-largest economy in the world by nominal 
GDP – although it ranked 73rd by GDP per capita in 2019 – and the largest by purchasing power 
parity (IMF, 2019b). In addition, as stressed by the OECD (2020), it remains the second-largest 
recipient of foreign direct investment in the globe after the United States. When considering all 
these aspects, it seems clear that China has turned from a poor, stagnant country into a major 
emerging power. As Morrison (2019) outlined, the two major forces behind this rapid economic 
advancement are found on large-scale capital investment (funded by vast domestic savings and 
foreign investment) and swift productivity growth. 
On the one hand, the country has historically maintained an impressively high national savings 
rate. Back in the 1980s, national savings constituted around 35-40 percent of GDP, a figure that 
climbed to an unprecedented peak of 52 percent in 2008 following China’s entry into the World 
Trade Organisation in 2001. The Global Financial Crisis, nevertheless, led to a gradual decline 
of the rate to 46 percent in 2017. Despite this shrinkage, Zhang et al. (2018) reported that the 
state’s national savings are believed to be one of the highest in the world, widely exceeding the 
global average rate of 20 percent and of 15 percent for emerging markets. On the other hand, it 
must be noted that China’s total factor productivity increased from 3 percent to 13 percent of 
the US level during the 1978-2007 cycle (Zhu, 2012). This remarkable rise has been primarily 
attributed to the reallocation of resources to more productive uses brought by the 1978 reform, 
particularly in those sectors that were previously heavily intervened by the executive. However, 
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) predicted that an additional 30 percent potential factor productivity 
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The metamorphosis from an extremely impoverished agricultural system to a mighty industrial 
powerhouse has also been reflected in the evolution of both GDP (see Figure 6a) and the value-
added by each of the productive activities (See Figure 6b). As reported by Kong et al. (2012), 
China’s per capita GDP before reforms were implemented was lower than India’s, Pakistan’s, 
Indonesia’s, and Thailand’s, and merely about 3 percent of that of the United States. Since then, 
the country has prospered in what has been depicted by the World Bank as “the fastest sustained 
expansion by a major economy in history” – more than 850 million people have been released 
from the stronghold of poverty, and real GDP growth has approached a formidable 10 percent 
per year during the 1979-2018 period. In the last few years, however, this rate has evolved on 
a gradually decreasing basis (except for a slight increase in 2017): it fell from 10.6 percent in 
2010 to a preliminary estimate of 6.1 percent in 2019 (NBSC, 2020b), the nation’s slowest rate 
since 1990. In a similar manner, the IMF (2019a) forecasted in its World Economic Outlook a 
progressive slowdown to 5.5 percent by 2024, a digit that could be reduced even further given 
the unpredictability surrounding the growing trade war between China and the United States. 
To avoid stagnation, as pointed out by Morrison (2019), the administration must turn the state 
into a major hub for new technology and innovation and/or put new comprehensive economic 
reforms into effect. Otherwise, it could eventually be caught in what is known as the “middle-
income trap”. This phenomenon refers to low-income countries that successfully transitioned 
to middle-income economies, but that could not maintain high levels of productivity gains and 
were finally unable to achieve a high-income, fully developed status. 
 
The economic restructuring was also accompanied by a substantial opening of China to the rest 
of the world. According to Prasad and Rumbaugh (2004), the nation’s share in global trade has 
been boosted from less than 1 percent in 1979 to about 6 percent in 2003. Indeed, the country 
has rapidly become a major player in international trade: it has been the largest trading economy 
since 2013, and currently ranks as the world’s leading exporter and second-biggest importer of 
goods. Notwithstanding, the IMF recently warned about the severe recession triggered by the 
ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. It may impact trade flows worldwide, in turn affecting Chinese 
GDP, by means of a decline in both external and domestic demand. Early effects of the outbreak 
already display a drop in industrial profits of 38.3 percent and a 20.5 percent fall in total retail 
sales of consumer goods (NBSC, 2020c; NBSC, 2020d) in solely the first two months of 2020. 
Figure 6. (A) GDP (¥100 Million) and (B) Value-Added by Activity (¥100 Million), 1978–2019 
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1. A Brief Review of the Literature 
1.1. Previous Research on the Issue 
This section seeks to give a brief description of the most significant literature on both income 
distribution and poverty problems. Empirical studies and relevant hypothesis will be reviewed 
to provide a theoretical background for this problematic before delving deeper into the ongoing 
trends present in the Chinese society. But first there must be a clear understanding of what the 
concepts of inequality and poverty mean, as they will be used extensively throughout this paper. 
The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary describes inequality (n.d.) as “the unfair difference 
between groups of people in society, when some have more wealth, status or opportunities than 
others”. However, as this is such a broad concept, most authors generally distinguish between 
two different views when referring to economic or monetary disparities (Alfonso et al., 2015a). 
▪ Inequality of opportunities: It depicts a state in which individuals’ freedom to pursue 
a life of their own choosing is restricted by circumstances beyond their control, such as 
their gender, ethnicity, family background or disability. Possible examples of this view 
include unequal access to employment or education. 
▪ Inequality of outcomes: It occurs when members of a society do not possess the same 
level of material wealth or general levels of living and economic conditions, which may 
be the result of both disadvantageous attributes outside of their control and their talent 
and effort. This view is primarily concerned with the material dimensions of well-being 
and embraces aspects like the level of income, educational attainment, and health status. 
Each specific inequality is the outcome of a multitude of different factors and suggests distinct 
scenarios, so unique economic policies must be employed in each case. The former is concerned 
with setting a “common starting place”, that is to say, with equalizing individuals’ opportunities 
of living so that they are able to freely determine their life. Hence, equality of opportunities is 
provided when policies are enforced to compensate particular members of a society for their 
disadvantageous attributes. The latter, in contrast, is concerned with the “finish line”. It argues 
that equality of outcomes could exist if both income levels and means of living were equalised. 
Poverty, on the other hand, can likewise be understood from two different standpoints. Absolute 
poverty, as the 1995 UN World Summit for Social Development depicted, refers to a “condition 
characterised by severe deprivation of basic human needs, including food, safe drinking water, 
sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and information. It depends not only on income 
but also on access to services”. Individuals, hence, are unable or just barely able to meet their 
absolute needs under this scenario. Relative poverty, in turn, affects people whose household 
income falls below half the median level prevailing in the state where they live (OECD, 2005). 
Sometimes, yet, a 60 percent of the median income is used instead (Marx and Van Den Bosch, 
2007). Individuals are said to be impoverished if they are able to meet their basic needs, but do 
not possess the amount of income considered necessary to sustain the average standard of living 
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determined by society. The main difference between both views lies in the fact that the latter’s 
notion changes over time as economic growth occurs, since the state’s wealth levels are altered. 
Income inequality has historically been a theme of interest for many economists, who have been 
actively presenting alternative explanations for this widespread phenomenon. Plausible causes 
are multiple and diverse. Larrain (2012) has suggested inequality may be the result of financial 
liberalization, whereas Cassette, Fleury and Petit (2012) claimed it emerged on account of the 
spectacular growth of international trade. Tsai, Huangy and Yangz (2012), conversely, drew 
attention to globalisation, and noted that income distribution appears fairer in highly developed 
nations as they enjoy a deeper international economic integration. But, without a doubt, one of 
the best-known hypotheses is the one first conceived by Simon Kuznets in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Kuznets did pioneering research on income 
distribution and structural change, a field of 
study “plagued by looseness in definitions, 
unusual scarcity of data, and pressures of 
strongly held opinions” (Kuznets, 1955) 
prior to the promulgation of his empirical 
work. In Economic Growth and Income 
Inequality (1955) and Quantitative Aspects 
of the Economic Growth of Nations (1963), 
he comprehensively examined the relation 
between income inequality and economic growth. He ultimately discovered that both variables 
are indeed connected in what came to be known as the inverted-U hypothesis (See Figure 7). 
This theory postulates that as an impoverished economy develops, market forces first increase 
the level of income inequality until eventually reaching a peak from which it begins to decline. 
The inverted-U hypothesis departs from the logic that, in a country’s early development phase, 
individuals who already possess enough income can benefit from the appearance of emerging 
investment opportunities – hereby, making their wealth even greater. In contrast, the working 
class does not witness a significant change in wage levels by reason of the influx of low-cost 
rural labour to the urban environment. The combination of both factors causes a large expansion 
in the income gap, which becomes increasingly evident as society undergoes industrialization. 
This process sparks a shift of the centre of the economy to the cities, thus triggering a growth 
in internal migration by rural labourers seeking better-paying jobs. As a result of such a trend, 
rural population plummets as urban population continually rises, and a considerable urban-rural 
gap arises. Inequality is expected to eventually drop once a certain level of average income is 
attained and industrialization allows for both democratization and the conception of a welfare 
state. As Ravallion (2016) pointed out, the Kuznets argument can also be understood as a model 
explaining the active role of urbanisation in the reduction of poverty – poverty, he argues, could 
be directly diminished through the absorption of rural labour into the expanding modern sector. 
Figure 7. Kuznets’ Inverted-U Hypothesis 
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Some experts have nevertheless questioned the validity of Kuznets’ hypothesised pattern since 
the late 1980s. They contend that the inverted U-shaped curve does not result from a particular 
nation’s economic progress, but rather indicates historical dissimilarities between the countries 
studied in terms of both economic development and inequality. As suggested by Fields (1999), 
Kuznets’ highest inequality observations belong primarily to Latin American economies. Thus, 
he emphasizes, being a middle-income country does not necessarily imply having high levels 
of inequality – it is Latin America that has historically presented highly unequal distributions 
of land, wealth, and other assets with respect to other developing states. When controlling for 
this variable, the inverted-U shape relationship tends to fade, and the aforementioned postulate 
is consequently rejected. 
Piketty’s work has been acknowledged as one of the most relevant criticisms of Kuznets’ thesis, 
sometimes deemed as “not only scientifically but also politically motivated” (Lyubimov, 2017). 
In Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Piketty, 2014), he carefully compiled an extensive data 
base covering the change in both wealth and income inequality in Europe and the United States 
since the 18th century. He found that the two regions indeed share a similar pattern of evolution. 
For the former, he selected the leading 19th century colonial powers: France and Britain. Data 
illustrates that these economies were experiencing an increasing inequality at that time, a trend 
that was successfully disrupted by the World Wars and the Great Depression. The authorities 
implemented relatively high tax rates to fund war-related expenditures, which subsequentially 
diminished disparities until the 1980s. Since then, they began to climb once again at a dramatic 
pace. Along the same lines, the United States showed growing inequality levels during the 19th 
century. They similarly dropped during the 1920s and did not increase again until the 1980s, 
when deregulation and privatization policies were enacted. Unlike Kuznets, Piketty believed 
that the reduction of inequality from the 1920s to the 1980s is the consequence of fiscal policies 
and shocks and asserted that a mature stage of economic expansion does not by itself reduce 
inequality. He summarised his argument on the formula r > g, by which he claimed that the 
main driver of inequality “is the tendency of the rate of return on capital r to exceed the rate of 
growth of output g” (Piketty, 2014). He also indicated that disparities – which are viewed as an 
integral part of capitalism by the author – potentially pose a risk to the democratic order, since 
affluent individuals could eventually take both the political and economic powers. Given such 
a scenario, he proposes a global wealth tax of up to 2 percent as a means to address this matter. 
Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization (Lakner and Milanovic, 2016) 
has also been considered one of the leading exponents in the field of global income inequality. 
Drawing on a vast array of relevant data, the authors clearly found that economic globalisation 
has produced both winners and losers. To support this position, they reproduced in a chart the 
change in each percentile of the world’s income distribution for the period 1988-2008. Wealth 
gains created during this era of “high globalization”, as it accordingly proved, were not evenly 
distributed. The resulting curve greatly differed from Kuznets’ inverted-U and Piketty’s S – it 
rather adopted a distinctive “elephant” shape, with its tail on the left and its trunk lifted up on 
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the right-hand side (see Figure 8). The four 
highlighted dots (namely A, B, C, D) reveal 
which percentiles have benefited the most 
from this process and which have been left 
behind. The two big winners are the middle 
global class (point B), especially due to the 
spectacular growth of some emerging Asian 
economies; and the global elite (point D), 
primarily concentrated in Europe and North 
America. The biggest losers, in contrast, are 
the global extreme poor (point A), who have 
been trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty 
and violence; and the global upper middle class (point C), with stagnant or even falling incomes. 
The logic behind this dynamic can be explained through the increase in both international trade 
and competition: it has boosted the incomes of currently emerging powers and highly skilled 
individuals at the expense of the working middle class of wealthier Western countries. Further 
elaborating on the issue, Milanovic (2016) reported that, while inequality among nations seems 
to fall, inequality within nations seems to increase. He claimed that this trend could eventually 
turn social class – rather than location – into the main source of disparities, as in the 19th century. 
In any case, discussion on the causal effect of inequality is highly controversial and still remains 
an open issue. Not surprisingly, the OECD finally concluded that “the empirical evidence as to 
the key drivers of inequality remains largely inconclusive” in its 2011 report Divided We Stand. 
1.2. Theoretical Background: Measuring Development 
Before providing an overview of the state of nationwide social development, it is necessary to 
identify the main indicators used to monitor both poverty and inequality and to underline their 
relevance and appropriateness for this paper. 
The most common instruments to gauge poverty are the head-count ratio and the poverty gap. 
The former indicates the proportion of a country’s population living below the national poverty 
line (Tendulkar and Jain, 1995). The latter, in contrast, signals the average distance separating 
the total population from the poverty line (counting the non-poor as having a distance of zero), 
expressed as a percentage of the poverty line (United Nations, 2003). The higher the index, the 
greater the poverty gap – in other words, the living conditions of the poorest will be well below 
the poverty threshold. It provides, therefore, a good insight of the actual incidence and depth of 
poverty within a society. It is additionally regarded as an improvement of the head-count ratio, 
which merely counts the number of individuals falling below the poverty line and is completely 
insensitive to how income is distributed among them, thus considering them equally poor (Sen, 
1976). Both indicators, as stressed in their definitions, heavily rely on the so-called poverty line.  
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Figure 8. Lakner-Milanovic Global Growth Incidence 
Curve, 1988–2008 
 
Source: Asian Development Blog. 
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It represents the minimum level of income necessary to satisfy basic needs and is computed by 
taking the overall value of the resources deemed essential to sustain an average adult in a given 
country. For this reason, those falling beneath this monetary threshold are believed to be living 
in absolute poverty. Since the cost of living varies significantly from state to state, each nation 
displays a unique poverty line. It should be noted, though, that the data used for the purpose of 
this paper is primarily based upon the World Bank’s international poverty line, given that ratios 
applying the Chinese poverty threshold are not available. This global standard was established 
by the aforementioned institution to help estimate the total number of people living in extreme 
poverty and enable a comparison between countries. It has to be periodically updated to reflect 
the evolution of the costs of basic food, clothes, and shelter across the world – the last revision 
was made in October 2015 (at 2011 PPP), and established $1.90 per day as the global absolute 
minimum. Individuals under this benchmark accordingly suffer severe levels of deprivation in 
terms of basic human needs. 
Income inequality, on the other hand, is most commonly expressed in the figure known as Gini 
coefficient. It is a measure of statistical dispersion that ranks a nation’s income distribution in 
a range between 0 and 1. If a given society obtains a score of 0, everyone would be expected to 
possess the very same amount of wealth. A score of 1, conversely, indicates perfect inequality 
– it could mean, for instance, that a single individual within that particular society owns all the 
country’s income, whereas the remaining residents have none. The higher the coefficient, the 
more unequal the allocation is. This digit, hence, evaluates the extent to which the distribution 
within a given economy deviates from what would be considered a perfectly equal distribution 
(Alfonso et al., 2015b). This paper will review the Gini index – that is to say, the Gini coefficient 
multiplied by 100 – published not only by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, but also 
by other academics and international organisations. The variety of sources will provide a better 
portrait of the current dynamics present in the country. It is worth mentioning that a value above 
50 is considered high; a value ranging from 30 to 49, medium; and a value lower than 30, low. 
Income distribution will be further examined by sorting households into quintiles and deciles, 
so a clear understanding of both terms is essential. When a given population is divided into five 
equal-sized groups, each of the resulting shares is known as a quintile. Households are ordered 
in accordance with the value of their total disposable income, from lowest to highest. Therefore, 
the lowest quintile represents the 20 percent of the population with the lowest incomes, whereas 
the fifth quintile refers to the wealthiest 20 percent. Similarly, each of the segments that result 
from the division of a given population into ten equally large subsections is known as a decile. 
Data is arranged in the same manner: the lowest decile refers to the poorest 10 percent, and the 
tenth decile contains the highest income 10 percent. This dissertation will employ this cleavage 
as a complement of the Gini index for the analysis of economic disparities within the Chinese 
society. The Gini index will be used in the first place to appraise the overall incidence of income 
inequality, and a split of the population into quintiles and deciles will be subsequently carried 
out to disclose the existing differences in income distribution among the distinct income groups. 
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The Human Development Index will be finally reviewed to provide an overview of the progress 
made in the levels of national socio-economic development. It is a composite index devised by 
the United Nations that measures the average achievement in three basic goals or end products 
of progress: longevity, assessed by life-expectancy at birth; knowledge, measured by a weighted 
average of adult literacy (two-thirds) and gross school enrolment ratio (one-third); and standard 
of living, evaluated by gross national income per capita (Todaro and Smith, 2009). Each country 
is ranked on a scale from 0 to 1 – the higher its score, the greater its level of human development. 
This indicator will be compared to the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index, which 
adjusts for inequality each of the aforementioned dimensions with the purpose of capturing the 
actual HDI of an average individual. In other words, this index inspects how these achievements 
are distributed within a society, thus disclosing the overall loss in human development resulting 
from the presence of disparities among its members. Under a scenario of perfect equality, both 
indices will be identical. But if, on the contrary, the distribution of health, education and income 
is unequal, the IHDI will fall below the HDI. The main difference between both metrics lies in 
the fact that, while the IHDI represents the actual level of human development (accounting for 
inequality), the HDI suggests the potential or maximum level of human development that could 
be achieved in a fair and equal society (Kovacevic, 2010). 
These indicators offer a powerful tool to better examine the living conditions and well-being of 
the Chinese population, not to forget their opportunities to achieve a better, more fulfilling life. 
 
2. Ongoing Trends on Poverty and Inequality 
This section aims to provide a deeper understanding of the current state of both poverty and 
inequality in China, as well as to identify and discuss the most observed trends. The starting 
point of the present study is the 1978 “reform and opening-up” policy, explained in detail in the 
previous chapter. As already mentioned, this reform resulted in a spectacular economic growth, 
which was accordingly reflected in the national GDP. The objective, hence, is to examine if the 
increased wealth has been equally distributed among the Chinese population, not to forget the 
overall impact the reform had on poverty. It should be noted that the focus will be on the last 
few decades, both because the GDP grew at a more intense rate during this period, and because 
it is the moment from which data on this issue is available. 
World Bank estimations illustrate that the head-count ratio has clearly followed a downward 
trend since the 1990s (see Figure 9a). Data was first made available in 1990, when the ratio 
was estimated at 66.2 percent. This means that about 66.2 percent of the Chinese population 
was living in absolute poverty or that, in other words, this proportion of individuals could not 
satisfy their most basic needs. Nevertheless, this value began to gradually decrease since then 
until eventually becoming 0.5 percent in 2016 (the last year for which records exist). Nowadays, 
therefore, only about 0.5 percent of society lives beneath the international poverty line of $1.90. 
 
 
III. INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 
 
25 
In a similar manner, the World Bank estimates a significant drop in the size of the poverty gap 
since the early 1990s (see Figure 9b). The indicator equalled 24.1 percent when it was initially 
reported in 1990. This means that, on average, the poor had an expenditure shortfall of 24.1 
percent of the $1.90 per day poverty line. But it similarly declined throughout the last decades 
until reaching a minimum level of 0.1 percent in 2016. It represents the current difference, on 
average, between poor individuals and the poverty line – it is a remarkable low value, especially 
if compared to accessible historical records. 
 
According to these figures, thus, it can be concluded that Deng Xiaoping’s Four Modernisations 
and the ensuing internationalization of China notably contributed to the reduction of absolute 
or extreme poverty within the country. Since 1990, the share of population that fails to maintain 
basic living standards has been reduced by 99.24 percent. The poverty gap, in turn, has likewise 
been cut by 99.59 percent. This implies that, although a small percent of absolute poverty still 
exists, poor households have incomes near the international poverty threshold. In consequence, 
the incidence and depth of extreme poverty in the Chinese population can be deemed irrelevant. 
Income inequality, however, displays a 
distinct pattern of evolution. Information 
has been gathered from different sources 
with the purpose of presenting a more 
realistic image of the existing disparities 
among the population. These include the 
empirical work of Ravallion and Chen 
(2007), World Bank estimates, and data 
from the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China. When scanning the change in the 
Gini index, two separate periods can be 
distinguished (see Figure 10). The first, from 1985 to 2001, exhibits a clearly upward trend. It 
should be underlined, though, that this interval experienced a series of fluctuations: there was 
a downward tendency during the years 1995-96, and a slight decrease was noted in 1987 and 
1990. The index increased from a mere 28.95 in 1985 to 44.73 in 2001, a value that denotes 
Figure 9. (A) Head-Count Ratio and (B) Poverty Gap at $1.90 a Day (2011 PPP), 1990–2016 
   
Source: Own Work Based on World Bank Estimates. 
 
Figure 10. Gini Index, 1981–2018 
 
Source: Own Work Based on Ravallion and Chen (2007), World 
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medium inequality levels. Before this interval, conversely, the index scored under 30 in most 
years for which data is available, even reaching a minimum of 28.28 in 1983 – inequality was, 
in consequence, considered low. The second period, from 2003 to 2018, is characterised by a 
relative stability. According to the NBSC, values regularly ranged from a low of 46.2 (2015) to 
a high of 49.1 (2008) – no significant changes have occurred, and inequality levels are thus still 
considered medium. Yet, it must be pointed out that these estimates are close to 50, a value that 
denotes high inequality levels. The World Bank, by contrast, points towards a totally different 
scenario. The institution reports a declining trend since 2010, decreasing from 43.7 in 2010 to 
38.5 in 2016 (as opposed to the 48.1 and 46.5, respectively, stated by the NBSC). It indicates 
figures that are considerably lower than the official ones, together with a much steeper decline. 
As these data illustrate, the growth of wealth has brought more inequality to the Chinese society. 
Figure 10 reflects that aspects of both Kuznets and Piketty’s theories are met. On the one hand, 
as Kuznets stressed, an increased income per capita led to higher inequality levels. The period 
1985-2001 gives evidence of this hypothesis, as disparities grew from a low to a moderate level. 
On the other, as highlighted by Piketty, a mature economic stage did not by itself result in a 
reduction of inequality. The interval 2003-18, if considering official figures, exemplifies this 
premise: the Gini index remained relatively constant, without recording any significant change. 
In order to delve deeper in the analysis of inequality, Chinese citizens have been classified into 
quintiles and deciles. This will allow for a better assessment of the general pattern of income 
distribution and will provide a good insight of the prevailing differences between social groups. 
 
The National Bureau of Statistics of China relayed that the distribution of income for the period 
2013-18, in terms of yuan, showed an upward tendency for all five quintiles (see Figure 11a). 
The fourth quintile presented the biggest percentual increase (49.71 percent), and was followed 
by the highest (48.85 percent), second (48.76 percent), third (47.72 percent), and lowest (46.30 
percent) income quintiles. In absolute terms, however, the fifth quintile registered the greatest 
growth, with ¥23,182.9, whereas the first recorded the smallest, with ¥2,038.1. In addition, data 
from 2018 shows that there is still a gap of ¥64,199 between the upper and lower quintiles. The 
overall rise in wealth substantiates Lakner and Milanovic’s hypothesis: the unequivocal winners 
Figure 11. (A) Distribution of Income by Quintiles in ¥, 2013–18 and (B) in %, 1990–2016 
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of globalisation have been the middle and upper classes of emerging Asian markets, like China, 
which has been accordingly reflected in the significant expansion that the second, third, fourth, 
and fifth groups experienced. 
For the purpose of comparing the different data already collected and enhancing the discussion, 
World Bank estimations have also been considered. (see Figure 11b) They reflect, in percentual 
terms, the variation in the distribution of income by quintiles for the period 1990-2016. The 
interval 2013-16, for which figures were also supplied by the NBSC, presents increases in all 
but the fifth quintile, which decreased by about 2.16 percent. The greatest growth was registered 
by the first quintile (4.84 percent), which was followed by the second (3.88 percent), third (2 
percent), and fourth (0.45 percent) income quintiles. The whole time span, nonetheless, exhibits 
a distinct scenario. From 1990 to 2016, all except the fourth and upper quintiles (which recorded 
a 0.45 and 11.03 percent increase, respectively) experienced a percentual decline. It was most 
notable in the lower quintile (21.69 percent), which was followed by the second (13.71 percent) 
and the third (6.71 percent) income groups. Data from 2016 also shows that, while the highest 
income quintile owns about 45.3 percent of the total nation’s wealth, the lowest income quintile 
only possesses about 6.5 percent – a profound gap between better- and worse-off social groups. 
Estimates for the income distribution by 
deciles reveal a comparable pattern (see 
Figure 12). In a similar vein, the World 
Bank reported, for the period 1990-2016, 
a remarkable decrease of 22.86 percent 
for the bottom decile, and a rise of about 
13.57 percent for the top decile. But, if 
only the interval 2013-16 is considered, 
the lowest decile instead presents an 8 
percent increase, whereas a 3.30 percent 
drop is registered for the highest. Recent 
data additionally reveals that the richest tenth percent of the Chinese population possesses about 
29.3 percent of the country’s wealth, while the less affluent tenth percent owns only 2.7 percent. 
These figures illustrate that a similar evolution and tendency can be observed when evaluating 
estimates provided by the World Bank. From 1990 to 2016, the most unprivileged households 
have seen their incomes diminished, whereas the richest have enjoyed a growth in their capital. 
In other words, the overall trend has been for the wealthiest to become wealthier, and for the 
poorest to become poorer. It should be pointed out, notwithstanding, that this pattern appears 
to be questioned since 2010. The latest data on both the Gini index and the income distribution 
by quintiles and deciles corroborates that the exact opposite effect is taking place at the present 
time. This means that, while the national income belonging to the less affluent social groups is 
currently experiencing a steady growth, that of the richest Chinese residents is instead dropping. 
Figure 12. Distribution of Income by Deciles (%), 1990–2016 
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The Human Development Index has been finally evaluated to gauge the overall degree of socio-
economic development in China (see Table A). According to the United Nations Development 
Programme, the HDI value has grown from 0.501 in 1990 to 0.758 in 2018. This 51.30 percent 
increase has enabled the country to be labelled as having a “high level of human development”. 
It is important to highlight that the nation has moved from a value lower than 0.550 (which is 
considered a low HDI) to one near 0.800 (which would be considered a very high HDI) in just 
over three decades. Correspondingly, the indicator’s components have risen over this time span. 
From 1990 to 2018, life expectancy increased by 7.6 years, reaching an average of 76.6 years. 
As far as the knowledge aspect is concerned, the expected and mean years of schooling rose by 
5.1 and 3.1, respectively. The most recent information suggests they score at 13.9 and 7.9 years. 
The GNI per capita (at 2011 PPP), in turn, presented a considerable growth of $14,597, rising 
to $16,127 in 2018. Yet, these figures are insensitive to the degree of inequality, so the HDI 
must be adjusted to appropriately cover the real progress made in health, education, and income. 




Life Expectancy at 
Birth 
Expected Years of 
Schooling 








1990 69.1 8.8 4.8 1.530 0.501  
1995 69.9 9.1 5.7 2.522 0.549  
2000 71.4 9.6 6.5 3.651 0.591 IHDI 
Value 2005 73.0 11.0 6.9 5.665 0.643 
2010 74.4 12.9 7.3 9.458 0.702 0.541 
2015 75.9 13.8 7.7 13.485 0.742 N/A 
2016 76.2 13.9 7.8 14.311 0.749 N/A 
2017 76.5 13.9 7.8 15.212 0.753 0.644 
2018 76.7 13.9 7.9 16.127 0.758 0.636 
 
Source: Own Work Based on UNDP Human Development Report 2019 and UNDP Data. 
 
The Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index for 2018 was 0.636, which supposes a loss 
of 16.09 percent with respect to the original (unadjusted) 0.758. The 2019 Human Development 
Report (UNDP, 2019) estimates an average coefficient of human inequality of 15.7 – this value 
represents an unweighted arithmetic mean of disparities in health, education, and income. The 
approximate inequality in each of these dimensions, hence, was 7.9 percent in life expectancy, 
11.7 percent in education, and 27.4 percent in income. It should be stressed that, although the 
HDI registered in 2018 was higher than that of the preceding year, the IHDI value was slightly 
smaller – 2017 registered a lower loss of human development, estimated at about 14.48 percent. 
Yet, it still constitutes a lower loss than that suffered in 2010, which approached 22.93 percent. 
Several scholars agree on the existence of a series of trends hidden within these data that still 
persist in nowadays China. These include a relevant rural-urban divide, a gap between regions 
on the basis of their geographical location (depending principally on their proximity to the sea), 
inequality of opportunities in education, and an adverse impact derived from the demographic 
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2.1. The Rural-Urban Divide 
The income gap between rural and urban households is considered one of the major causative 
factors of overall inequality in China. As indicated by Li et al. (2013), the gap contributed 45 
percent and 51 percent to national disparities in 2002 and 2007, respectively. And it appears to 
have widened over the last decades, since its contribution was 37 percent in 1988 and 45 percent 
in 1995 (Sicular et al., 2007). But, before further examining this phenomenon, it is interesting 
to observe how the rural-urban composition of the Chinese population has changed since 1978. 
The population structure, by urban-rural 
typology, has been considerably altered 
since the 1978 “reform and opening-up” 
policy was enforced (see Figure 13). By 
then, rural people accounted for the vast 
majority of the population – only about 
17.92 percent of residents were living in 
urban centres, while the remaining 82.08 
percent dwelled in rural areas. Yet, this 
arrangement progressively changed until 
urban residents outnumbered rural ones, 
starting from 2011. The most recent figures available indicate that, in 2018, 59.58 percent of 
Chinese inhabitants dwelled in urban areas, while around 40.42 percent lived in the countryside. 
This implies that urban population has expanded by as much as 232.48 percent over the time 
span 1978-2018, whereas rural citizens have decreased by 50.76 percent over the same period. 
Now that the rural-to-urban population shift experienced by China has been substantiated, it is 
necessary to review how the distribution of income by rural and urban households has changed. 
 
Figure 14. Per Capita Disposable Income of Households    Figure 15. Urban-Rural Income Ratio, 1978–2018 
in ¥, 1978–2018 
   
Source: Own Work Based on NBSC Data*.       Source: Own Calculations Based on NBSC Data*. 
 
* Per capita disposable income reported in the 2017 China Statistical Yearbook differs from that reported in 2019. The 
first graphic displays 2019 data; the second, a combination of both. 
 
 
Figure 13. Rural and Urban Population (%), 1978–2018 
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All dwellings, regardless of their geographic location, have recorded a strong and steady growth 
in their income over the time period considered (see Figure 14). At a national level, per capita 
disposable income has increased from a mere ¥171.2 in 1978 to a significant ¥28,228 in 2018. 
Data can be likewise classified on the basis of urban or rural residence. On the one hand, urban 
households have seen their per capita income rise from ¥343.4 in 1978 to ¥39,250.8 in 2018. 
On the other, that of rural households has increased from ¥133.6 in 1978 to ¥14,617 in 2018. If 
the entire time span is considered, individuals brought up in cities appear to be the ones that 
have experienced the most significant progress in both absolute and relative terms – per capita 
disposable income grew by 11,330.05 percent in the cities, and by about 10,840.87 percent in 
the countryside. But, if analysing just the more recent years, rural areas seem to have enjoyed 
the greatest relative increases. For instance, the change in per capita income from 2017 to 2018 
was 8.82 percent in the countryside, but only 7.84 percent in urban areas. In a similar manner, 
the variation from 2016 to 2017 was about 8.65 percent in rural areas, and around 8.27 percent 
in the cities. In spite of consisting only of slight differences, this tendency has been followed 
uninterruptedly since 2008. This indicates that, since 2008, the disposable income of the rural 
community has been rising at a much faster rate. 
The household per capita disposable income is closely related to the urban-rural income ratio. 
This indicator is computed as the average income per capita of urban residents divided by the 
average income per capita of rural residents, and measures by how much the income in urban 
areas is higher than that in rural areas. It should be noted that, since the NBSC applied a different 
calculation basis starting from 2018, figures from the 2017 China Statistical Yearbook do not 
correspond with those published from 2018 onwards. This paper has employed data from both 
dossiers with the purpose of obtaining a more realistic view of the factual situation in the nation. 
The urban-rural income ratio for the years 1978 to 2018 is characterised by frequent fluctuations 
(see Figure 15). The indicator followed a downward path until 1985, when a minimum of 1.86 
was recorded. This means that urban residents’ income was 1.86 times higher than that of rural 
inhabitants. Based on historical accessible records, this is the lowest figure ever registered since 
the implementation of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform. Notwithstanding, it showed a general 
rising trend since the mid-80s, and particularly between 1997 and 2009. This interval presents 
the widest income gap in the whole time series, reaching a maximum value of 3.33 both in 2007 
and 2009 (according to NBSC 2017 data), or 3.14 in 2007 (according to NBSC 2019 data). In 
any case, per capita disposable income of people living in cities more than tripled that of those 
living in rural locations. As reported by Knight and Song (1999), this differential is very high 
by international standards. But the gap began narrowing again since then, and a value of 2.69 
was recorded in 2018. Despite being a lower figure, it still implies that the urban community’s 
income more than doubles that of the rural one. The Gini coefficient supplements this postulate. 
It increased from 0.34 in 2007 to 0.36 in 2013 for urban areas, and from 0.36 to 0.37 for rural 
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It is argued that China’s household registration or hukou system is a major contributing factor 
to the urban-rural difference (Sicular, 2013). It is an internal passport system that, as underlined 
by Liu (2005), has been used since the mid-1950s as a means of preventing unplanned migration 
and introducing formal administrative control over population movements, whether intra-urban, 
intra-rural, or rural-to-urban. Under the hukou system, Chinese individuals are divided into two 
separate groups: urban hukou holders and rural hukou holders. This classification is determined 
by birth and is passed from one generation to the next. Once a resident is assigned a category, 
changing his or her permanent place of residence can be extremely difficult, if not impossible 
– the system inhibits labour mobility and segregates the labour force (Boffy-Ramirez and Moon, 
2018). Urban individuals, as reported by Liu (2005), are provided with subsidized food, urban 
employment (commonly includes subsidized housing, healthcare, pension, and other benefits), 
subsidized education, welfare programs, and community cultural activities. Rural residents, in 
contrast, are relegated to second-class citizenship and deprived from such government-provided 
services. It should be noted that, since the mid-1990s, the hukou system has undergone a series 
of reforms that have eventually resulted in a reduction of the constraints on geographic mobility 
and a rapid migration from rural to urban areas (Sicular, 2013). Indeed, Li (2016) reported that 
the increased number of rural-urban migrant workers has been crucial in moderating the urban-
rural income gap via their remittances to rural areas. However, rural migrants continue to face 
serious barriers to permanent relocation, like employment discrimination, high housing costs, 
and low access to public services such as education and health care (Sicular, 2013). A revision 
or dismantling of this system, therefore, would be necessary to create a uniform labour market 
and to diminish rural-urban disparities in terms of both outcomes and opportunities (Liu, 2005). 
The detailed analysis of the urban-rural income ratio revealed, nevertheless, a slight narrowing 
of the gap in the last few years. This declining trend, as Li (2016) suggested, has been the result 
of the combination of multiple and diverse factors. First, the wages of unskilled and rural-urban 
migrant workers have just begun to grow at a faster rate than those of skilled urban workers. Li 
et al. (2015) reported that real wages of the former rose by 16 percent in 2010, and by 15 percent 
in 2011. Secondly, the Chinese administration launched a stimulation package in 2009 with the 
aim of mitigating the effects of the 2008 financial crisis. It included significant investments in 
infrastructures, which triggered further demand for both unskilled and migrant workers. Urban 
employment, in turn, was not adversely affected by the economic downturn – there was a 24 
percent increase in the number of urban workers over the 2007-13 period. Thirdly, the Chinese 
government has been actively issuing a series of policy measures to increase the income of rural 
and low-income households since 2003, which have notably contributed to the reduction of the 
urban-rural income gap (Li and Sicular, 2014). These include an exemption from agricultural 
taxes and fees since 2006, as well as agricultural subsidies for farming households since 2002. 
Besides, the Dibao program – an unconditional cash transfer programme aimed at providing a 
minimum livelihood guarantee, first introduced in urban areas in the 1990s – was extended to 
rural areas in the early 2000s with the purpose of alleviating poverty and enhancing the living 
standards of the poor in the countryside (Kakwani et al., 2008). Another relevant measure has 
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been the expansion of the rural social protection network, which currently covers most people 
living in the rural environment. For instance, the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme had 
a participation rate near 99 percent in rural zones by the end of 2013, and the New Rural Pension 
Scheme was established in 2010 to endow rural people 60 years old and over with 65 yuan per 
month (Li, 2016). 
This document has also examined income distribution by quintiles both in urban and rural areas 
to learn about the state of income disparities within each of these communities (see Figure 16). 
 
In the case of urban zones, the NBSC reported a steady increase in income for all five quintiles 
over the period 2013-18. The fourth quintile recorded the greatest percentual increase (50.78 
percent), and was followed by the highest (46.99 percent), third (45.60 percent), lowest (45.38 
percent), and second (41 percent) income quintiles. In absolute terms, the top quintile registered 
the biggest increase, with ¥27,145, whereas the bottom recorded the smallest, with ¥4,491. Data 
also shows that the gap between the first and fifth quintile was estimated at ¥70,520.20 in 2018. 
According to the same data source, all but the lowest quintile – which underwent a number of 
fluctuations – experienced a continued growth of income over the same time span in rural areas. 
The biggest percentual increase was registered by the fifth quintile (59.65 percent), which was 
followed by the fourth (52.77 percent), third (48.49 percent), second, (42.63 percent), and first 
(27.39 percent) income quintiles. In absolute terms, the highest quintile similarly recorded the 
greatest growth, with ¥12,718.90, whereas the lowest registered the smallest, with ¥788.30. A 
gap of ¥30,376.4 can be computed from 2018 data between better- and worse-off social groups. 
Upon careful review of these findings, two notable conclusions can be drawn (in relative terms). 
On the one hand, the lower quintile displays better chances of prospering in the city, where it 
presented a 45.38 percent wealth increase from 2013 to 2018. The growth in rural environments, 
conversely, was only 27.39 percent. On the other, upper quintile’s wealth seems to benefit from 
greater relative increases in the countryside, where it exhibited a 59.65 percent growth over the 
same time series. In the cities, it accounted for a relatively lower 46.99 percent. The remaining 
wealth quintiles do not show significant dissimilarities on the basis of urban or rural residence.  
Figure 16. Distribution of Income by Quintiles in ¥, (A) Urban and (B) Rural, 2013–18 
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2.2. Regional Differences: The Inland-Coastal Gap 
As Kanbur and Zhang (1999) underlined, the rural-urban gap is much greater than the inland-
coastal gap, and still remains a major source of income inequality in China. Notwithstanding, 
the trends followed by these disparities are significantly different – the rural-urban contribution 
stayed roughly constant over time, whereas the inland-coastal contribution rose markedly. This 
implies that differences between inland and coastal regions are becoming an increasing concern. 
In fact, Xie and Zhou (2014) found that around 12 percent of national income inequality can be 
attributed to disparities across provinces. This phenomenon, yet, does not constitute a distinctly 
unique circumstance in China: Kanbur and Venables (2007) highlighted that differences within 
countries are striking and have been increasing in the past quarter century. But it certainly stands 
as an important obstacle to generating equity across regions in China, particularly because of 
its broad territory, varied resource endowments, long economic history, and complex cultural 
features (Li and Haynes, 2010). 
China’s provinces can be grouped into four 
separate economic regions (see Figure 17): 
the Eastern region, which includes Beijing, 
Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, and Hainan; 
the Central region, which includes Shanxi, 
Henan, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, and Hunan; 
the Western region, which includes Inner 
Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, 
Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, 
Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang; and, lastly, 
the North-Eastern region, which includes 
Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang. It should 
be noted that the two SARs of Hong Kong and Macau are not incorporated in this classification. 
Before delving into the suggested analysis, the population of each of these economic regions 
has been examined with the purpose of learning about their importance in terms of demographic 
density. According to the NBSC, the population distribution has remained fairly constant over 
the period 2013-18 (see Figure 18). The Eastern region is by far the most populous one, with 
about 38.5 percent of the Chinese total inhabitants. It is followed by the Western region, with 
27.2 percent; Central region, with 26.6 percent; and the North-Eastern region, with 7.8 percent 
of the nation’s inhabitants. The change, as previously stated, has been insignificant. The greatest 
increase was recorded by the North-East (3.70 percent), which was followed by the East (0.79 
percent) and West (0.74 percent) of the country. The Centre, conversely, remained unchanged. 
One of the possible explanations for this minimal variation will be discussed later in this section. 
 
Figure 17. The Four Economic Regions of China 
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The breakdown of GDP data for the period 2013-18 by region provides a better comprehension 
and interpretation of the overall value of economic activity within each of the economic regions 
(see Figure 19). In 2018, as reported by the NBSC, the Eastern region made the most notable 
contribution to the national GDP: around 52.6 percent. This implies that, out of 31 provinces, 
just 10 provided slightly more than half of total China’s GDP. The Central region, in turn, made 
the second largest contribution (21.1 percent), and was followed by the Western (20.1 percent) 
and North-Eastern (6.2 percent) regions. In terms of relative development levels, the Central 
region recorded the highest growth (4.46 percent). The Eastern and Western regions similarly 
recorded percentual increases for this time span (2.73 and 0.50 percent, respectively), but the 
North-Eastern region instead presented a considerable decline of 27.91 percent. A number of 
conclusions can be drawn from these figures. On the one hand, Central provinces appear to be 
the ones that have upgraded their economic activity at a faster pace, whereas the North-Eastern 
ones seem to have witnessed a significant slowing down in their economic growth. On the other, 
the ratio between the Eastern and North-Eastern regions – the highest and lowest contributions 
to national GDP – reveals that there is a difference of 8.48, meaning that the contribution of the 
former was eight times greater than that of the latter in 2018. The difference with respect to the 
Western and Central provinces is of 2.62 and 2.49, respectively. In both cases, consequently, 
the contribution of the Eastern territory is more than twice that of the Western and Central areas. 
Yet, it must be pointed out that figures provided by the NBSC are not adjusted for population 
data from each of the regions. Thus, they do not present a realistic image of the factual situation 
in the country – firm conclusions cannot be drawn from this analysis, since it is not appropriate 
to compare the overall contribution of the Eastern region (10 provinces, 38.5 percent of the total 
population) with that of the North-Eastern region (3 provinces, 7.8 percent of the population). 
Disparities will be further studied through the review of per capita disposable income by region. 
But before getting there, it is interesting to compare these regions on the basis of their economic 
structure. In other words, to review the relevance of the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors. 
This will provide a good insight of the composition and patterns of each of the economic areas. 
 
Figure 18. Population by Region (%), 2013–18      Figure 19. GDP by Region (%), 2013–18 
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2013 34.9 49.2 56.8 26.4 21.6 17.2 27.6 20.3 18 11.1 8.8 7.9 
2014 34.5 49.6 55.9 26.3 21.5 17.9 28.2 20.4 18.4 11 8.5 7.8 
2015 34.5 50.6 55.6 26.1 21.4 18.3 28.5 20.2 18.4 10.9 7.7 7.7 
2016 34.4 52 56.1 26.4 21.9 18.5 29.2 20.2 18.5 10 6 6.8 
2017 34 52.3 56 25.4 22.5 18.8 30.9 19.5 18.6 9.6 5.7 6.5 
2018 34 52.2 55.4 25 22.5 19.4 31.4 19.8 18.9 6.4 5.4 9.6 
 
Source: Own Work Based on NBSC Data. 
Table B illustrates the industrial structure evolution in each of the regions for the period 2013-
18. The NBSC indicates that the service sector represents the largest sector in the Eastern zone, 
contributing 55.4 percent of national GDP in 2018. However, industry was the only expanding 
sector in the region (6.1 percent) – both the primary and tertiary activities recorded a decline of 
2.58 and 2.46 percent, respectively. Agriculture is a key sector for the Central provinces and 
represented about 25 percent of total China’s GDP in 2018. But its predominance in the region 
appears to be fragile, as it declined by 5.30 percent over this time span. Industry and services, 
conversely, presented a 4.17 and 12.79 percent growth, respectively. Western territories, in turn, 
heavily rely on the primary sector, which accounted for 31.4 percent of the national GDP and 
rose by 13.77 percent over the time period considered. The tertiary industry similarly increased 
by 5 percent, but the secondary industry instead fell by 2.46 percent. As for the North-Eastern 
region, lastly, the services sector makes the largest contribution to national GDP (9.6 percent) 
and has experienced a significant rise of 21.52 percent since 2013. The primary and secondary 
activities, oppositely, presented a sharp decline of 42.34 and 38.64 percent, respectively. To put 
it briefly, provinces located near the cost (Eastern, North-Eastern) seem to rely most on tertiary 
activities, while those situated inland (Central, Western) depend mainly on their primary sector. 
Per capita disposable income provides a 
better reflection of the actual disparities 
among Chinese regions. As suggested by 
Goh et al. (2009), income in inland areas 
doubled, while that of coastal areas more 
than tripled between 1989 and 2004. For 
this research, data reported by the NBSC 
for the period 2013-18 has been scanned 
with the purpose of obtaining a view of 
the present situation in the country (see 
Figure 20). In absolute terms, estimates 
for 2018 reveal that the richest provinces  
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Figure 20. Per Capita Disposable Income of Regionwide 
Households in ¥, 2013–18 
 
Source: Own Work Based on NBSC Data. 
are those located in the East of China (¥36,298.2). These are followed by those situated in the 
North-East (¥25,543.2), Centre (¥23,798.3), and West (¥21,935.8) of the nation. Nonetheless, 
relative increases display a distinct pattern. Over the time period considered, the Western region 
recorded the greatest growth, with 57.60 percent. It was followed by the Central (55.91 percent), 
Eastern (53.43 percent), and North-Eastern (42.75 percent) regions. These inequalities can be 
more easily explained through the ratio between the better- and worse-off economic regions. A 
comparison between the wealthiest and the poorest zones – Eastern and Western, respectively 
– hints that, in 2018, the per capita income of the Eastern provinces was 1.65 times greater than 
that of the Western ones. It was also 1.53 times higher than that of the Central region, and 1.42 
times higher than that of the North-Eastern region. Hence, these findings suggest that inequality 
tends to be greater the farther a given territory is from the sea. 
A number of authors have supported the idea that Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform is the root 
cause of the last surge in regional inequalities. Li and Haynes (2010) underlined that it resulted 
both in a decentralization of central government authority and a strengthening of the authority 
of provincial and local government, including in fiscal terms. This, they argue, urged regional 
and local economies to formulate development strategies based on their respective comparative 
advantages – in consequence, the nation moved from a position of relative homogeneity among 
regions to one of increased diversity among them. Coastal regions benefitted the most from the 
openness brought by the 1978 policy, since they were located closer to the international market 
and more advanced economies, particularly Hong Kong and Taiwan (Fan et al., 2011). Besides, 
as emphasized by Yao (2009), they received a greater share of the central government’s capital 
investment. From 1999 to 2005, the coastal area was granted ¥4,696.7 billion (52.94 percent), 
whereas Central and Western provinces received ¥2,255.1 billion (25.42 percent) and ¥1920.4 
billion (21.65 percent), respectively. As explained in the previous chapter, these reforms rapidly 
turned the country into one of the largest recipients of foreign direct investment. But the coastal 
zone was the one that experienced much higher growth, which thus contributed to the widening 
of the inland-coastal gap (Fan et al., 2011). 
Income disparities among regions have remained significant over the past decades as a result, 
once more, of the hukou system. Kanbur and Zhang (1999) observed that labour migration may 
occur more easily from rural to nearby urban areas than from inland to coastal regions – in other 
words, migration at the inter-provincial level is much more challenging than that at the intra-
provincial level. As a means of illustration, a research led by Zhang and Chi in 1996 found that 
more than 96 percent of the migration from rural to urban zones was within the same province. 
As Jian et al. (1996) stressed, this tendency towards divergence will undoubtedly persist, since 
the geographic advantage of being a coastal province will always remain unaltered. However, 
political and institutional action is crucial to address this challenge, as it could eventually pose 
a serious threat to national unity and political stability (Liao and Wei, 2016). This is the reason 
why the Chinese administration considered regional disparities and polarisation as a major issue 
in policy making in its Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) (Wei, 2002). The government aimed 
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to ensure an “harmonious development”, particularly across regions. To achieve that objective, 
Fan et al. (2011) explained that three multiprong approaches were employed by the authorities: 
infrastructure investment and clustering, social protection investment, and governance reform. 
▪ First, investment in public infrastructure was prioritised for the lagging regions, where 
returns tend to be generally high. The Western Development Strategy is a good example 
of this policy: the government made considerable investments in infrastructures, mainly 
through improvements of roads and railways. This enabled the region to receive some 
of the outsourcing orders from coastal production facilities, in which demand for labour 
was greater than the available supply (Zhang et al., 2011). In addition, the cluster-based 
production model began to be promoted among the lagging regions, mostly because of 
its success in the coastal regions’ industrialization process. 
▪ Secondly, the country has made tremendous progress in social protection investments, 
which are especially important both in rural and inland areas. Nevertheless, the benefits 
provided by social protection programs are not portable across provinces. Migration, as 
a result, is implicitly discouraged – this certainly poses deep and serious problems given 
its ability to mitigate inequality. A possible solution to tackle this issue, hence, may be 
to connect social security systems across provinces and to make these benefits portable. 
▪ Thirdly, the regional gap may be addressed through governance reform, but measures 
can be more heterodox and context specific in such case. An experimental or trial-and-
error approach, therefore, must be adopted when implementing the required changes in 
this area instead of looking at the experience of other countries. For instance, Zhejiang 
province put all the counties under provincial government’s administration to better deal 
with the distributional consequences of the previously mentioned fiscal decentralisation. 
In order to enhance the study, per capita disposable income of both urban and rural households 
by region has been scrutinised. This will allow for a deeper and more effective analysis of the 
actual differences between the urban and rural areas among the separate economic regions and 
will supplement the findings obtained in the previous section of this paper. Before, nonetheless, 
the population composition in each of the groups has been audited to better assess the incidence 
of inequality. Own calculations were made to estimate the share of urban and rural inhabitants. 
Table C. Rural and Urban Population by Region (10,000 Persons), 2018 
 
Eastern Provinces Central Provinces 
Province Urban Rural Total Province Urban Rural Total 
Beijing 1863 291 2154 Shanxi 2172 1546 3718 
Tianjin 1297 263 1560 Henan 4967 4638 9605 
Hebei 4264 3292 7556 Anhui 3459 2865 6324 
Shanghai 2136 288 2424 Jiangxi 2604 2044 4648 
Jiangsu 5604 2447 8051 Hubei 3568 2349 5917 
Zhejiang 3953 1784 5737 Hunan 3865 3034 6899 
Fujian 2594 1347 3941     
Shandong 6147 3900 10047     
Guangdong 8022 3324 11346     
Hainan 552 382 934     
Total 
36432 17318 53750 
Total 
20635 16476 37111 
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Western Provinces North-Eastern Provinces 
Province Urban Rural Total Province Urban Rural Total 
Inner 
Mongolia 
1589 945 2534 Liaoning 2968 1391 4359 
Guangxi 2474 2452 4926 Jilin 1556 1148 2704 
Chongqing 2032 1070 3102 Heilongjiang 2268 1505 3773 
Sichuan 4362 3979 8341     
Guizhou 1711 1889 3600     
Yunnan 2309 2521 4830     
Tibet 107 237 344     
Shaanxi 2246 1618 3864     
Gansu 1258 1379 2637     
Qinghai 328 275 603     
Ningxia 405 283 688     
Xinjiang 1266 1221 2487     
Total 
20087 17869 37956 
Total 
6792 4044 10836 
0.53 0.47 1.00 0.63 0.37 1.00 
 
Source: Own Calculations Based on NBSC Data. 
Table C shows that the majority of the population is currently urban in all the economic regions. 
Notwithstanding, this pattern appears even more accentuated in the Eastern and North-Eastern 
provinces, where it represented about 0.68 and 0.63 percent of their total population. Figures of 
the Central region, in turn, reveal that around 0.56 percent of dwellers where urban, while those 
of the Western area point towards a 0.53 percent rate. Upon careful examination, the data seems 
to indicate that the farthest a given province is from the sea, the greatest its rural community is. 
 
As specified by the NBSC, per capita disposable income of urban households has maintained a 
steady upward trend over the period 2013-18 in all the economic regions (see Figure 21a). The 
Eastern area presents the highest absolute values during the whole time series, with ¥4,6432.6 
in 2018. The remaining provinces display similar values. In the same year, urban dwellers had 
a per capita income of ¥33,803.2 in the Central region, of ¥33,388.6 in the Western region, and 
of ¥32,993.7 in the North-Eastern region. Probably the most surprising finding is the position 
held by the North-Eastern provinces in this ranking, as they recorded the second greatest value 
in terms of the per capita disposable income of overall households – in other words, regardless 
of their urban or rural status. In relative terms, the Western zone registered the highest growth 
(49.30 percent) over the considered time span, and was followed by the Central (49.14 percent), 
Figure 21. Per Capita Disposable Income of (A) Urban and (B) Rural Households in ¥ by Region, 2013–18 
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Eastern (49.05 percent), and North-Eastern (40.36) areas. Hence, data illustrates that, apart from 
presenting the smallest absolute value, North-Eastern provinces likewise displayed the smallest 
relative increase. The gap between the richest and the poorest economic regions was estimated 
at ¥1,3438.9 in 2018. Put differently, per capita income available for living of urban households 
in Eastern China was 1.41 times higher than that in the North-East of the nation. 
The NBSC similarly determined a gradually rising tendency in the per capita disposable income 
of rural households for the four economic regions over the same time period (see Figure 21b). 
In absolute terms, the Eastern provinces recorded yet again the greatest values, with ¥18,285.7 
in 2018. During the same year, they were followed by the North-Eastern (¥14,080.4), Central 
(¥13,954.1), and Western (¥11,831.4) regions. In this instance, therefore, the ranking presented 
the same sequence as that of the per capita income of regionwide households. There is a distinct 
pattern, however, for relative increases. The Western area registered the greatest growth, with 
59.10 percent, and was followed by the Centre (55.34 percent), East (54.22 percent), and North-
East (44.24 percent) of the country. The gap between the Eastern and Western regions was of 
¥6,454.3 in 2018 – put another way, the per capita disposable income of rural households in the 
former was 1.55 times greater than that in the latter. The gap is thus wider than that of the city. 
These findings are in line with Kanbur and Zhang’s (1999) empirical work. They stressed that 
rural areas surrounding the coastal urban explosion greatly benefitted from the spillover effect. 
The most recent NBSC data reinforces this postulate, since the rural community from coastal 
zones, particularly from the Eastern region, appears to be the wealthiest in China. In addition, 
relative figures indicate that the Western Development Strategy has been extremely successful 
in boosting the economic growth of the region, as it recorded the greatest percentual increases. 
2.3. Unequal Educational Opportunity 
China has made huge progress in expanding its education system and raising the average levels 
of education attained by its enormous population (Golley and Kong, 2018). In 1986, the nation 
introduced the nine-year compulsory education system with the purpose of achieving universal 
enrolment among school-aged children and increasing the literacy rate. The reform was highly 
successful. Yang et al. (2014) indicated 
that average years of schooling rose from 
6.794 in 1996 to 8.28 in 2008, and World 
Bank Estimates denoted that the literacy 
rate grew from 65.505 percent in 1982 to 
96.841 percent in 2018 (see Figure 22). 
Furthermore, it has been one of the major 
factors contributing to poverty reduction 
(Dollar, 2007), since the poverty rate for 
individuals with nine years or more of 
education is only 2 percent. Nonetheless, 
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Figure 22. Literacy Rate (% of People Ages 15 and Above) 
 
Source: Own Work Based on World Bank Estimates. 
current arrangements in education do not allow for a more harmonious development of China. 
Instead, they perpetuate and reinforce inequality and generate a widening income gap between 
households with greater human capital endowment and those with less (Goh et al., 2009). Given 
education’s ability to boost economic development, determine household income, and enhance 
social mobility, urgent action from the government is required to address such disparities in an 
effective manner. Otherwise, inequality in opportunity may lead, in the long-term, to inequality 
in income, therefore worsening the previously discussed regional differences (Heckman, 2005). 
The divide between urban and rural areas contributes the most to overall education inequality 
(Goh et al., 2009). As a result of the aforementioned fiscal decentralization, local governments 
became the principal financial supporters of education. Considering that these communities are 
affected by different resource constraints, notable disparities soon emerged between them. On 
the one hand, as outlined by Yang et al. (2014), students from urban zones have better chances 
of accessing a relatively good-quality education, progressing to the next educational level, and 
accomplishing an overall better achievement. On the other, nevertheless, teachers with higher 
degrees and modern equipment tend to be rare in rural environments – these localities are less 
able to fund schooling, and poor households are less able to afford the high private cost of these 
services (Goh et al., 2009). Highly qualified individuals tend to live in urban areas, where they 
enjoy greater wealth, which consequently increases inequality levels. Owing to such a situation, 
Knight and Song (1999) contended that the place of a person’s birth can transform into a major 
determinant of that person’s skill level: the hukou system prompts dwellers to seek education 
in their respective places of residence, and by doing so reinforces disparities between urban and 
rural inhabitants in terms of educational attainment. In addition, Wang (2007) highlighted that 
further inequalities emerged because of the executive’s decision to stop providing free higher 
education and guaranteed employment for university students since the mid-1990s. He argues 
that less affluent students lacked both sufficient resources to afford their tertiary education and 
social networks to compete for jobs in the market economy. 
Social stratification constitutes the second major cause of disparities in educational opportunity 
(Goh et al., 2009). As stressed by Wang (2007), changes in education policies have been largely 
determined by the upper classes or elite groups over the past decades. These refer to individuals 
who are wealthy, powerful, or who hold professional positions in the nation. They have profited 
from education to maintain their class superiority and pass it from one generation to the next – 
in consequence, instead of promoting upward social mobility, education has been employed as 
a mechanism to perpetuate the benefits enjoyed by the most affluent families. Probably the most 
obvious example is the distinction between best and general schools in the urban areas (Wang, 
2007). The high classes make use of its social power and significant economic resources to send 
their children to elite schools. These educational facilities are endowed with better funding and 
the best professors and formators and prepare their pupils to attain an exceptional performance. 
Other minor elements that contribute to the unequal educational opportunity are the age factor, 
gender differences, and regional inequalities. Yet, their impact is much smaller in comparison.  
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First, older people tend to have less education than the young, particularly as a consequence of 
the notable progress made in the provision of basic education for school-aged children (Goh et 
al., 2009). Said differently, younger people now reach higher levels of educational attainment 
thanks to the Nine-Year Compulsory Education law. Secondly, the gender gap has been largely 
reduced by means of the aforesaid education policy and the gender equity promotion. In fact, 
as Figure 22 illustrates, the literacy rate in 2018 was estimated at 98.467 percent of males, and 
95.159 of females. This small difference might be the product of both cultural norms and family 
notions. Thirdly, Goh et al. (2009) underlines that, despite a considerable reduction in the Gini 
coefficient of the nation’s education, that of Western provinces is generally higher than that of 
Eastern provinces. This implies that educational inequality tends to be higher in Western areas, 
and thus fits the pattern of economic development detailed in the previous section of this paper. 
2.4. Population Dynamics and the Demographic Change 
Historically, as noted by Zhong (2011), the influence of population aging on income inequality 
has received little or no attention. It was not until recent times that emphasis has started to be 
made about how this phenomenon can further increase present disparities and harm economic 
growth. Nevertheless, there is clearly no consensus among scholars on its real effects on these 
dimensions. Some of them, such as Lan, Wei, and Wu (2014) and Miyazawa (2006), indicate 
that population’s aging indeed leads to a significant rise in income inequality. Others, including 
Jantti (1997), contend that it accounts only for a low share of the overall increase in disparities. 
Within a period of only 30 years, China has rapidly completed a demographic transition from 
a pattern featuring a low death rate, high birth rate, and high growth rate to one featuring a low 
death rate, low birth rate, and low growth rate (Cai and Wang, 2010). The country’s 2010 census 
indicated that the population aged 65 and above accounted for more than 8.92 percent of total 
population, and this figure could reach 16.52 percent in 2030 (Wang et al., 2017). This process 
of rapid aging is likely the result of notable socio-economic development, the broad diffusion 
of medical knowledge, and the 1997 one-child policy. As pointed out by Hsu et al. (2018), these 
factors led both to a reduction in the total fertility rate (it fell to less than 3 following the policy 
enforcement, and further to a value between 1 and 2 after 1990) and to a longer life expectancy. 
In consequence, they are frequently thought to have been active contributors to the decrease of 
the ratio of household members in working age. It changed from 0.62 in 1997 to 0.63 in 2000, 
but fell sharply to 0.48 in 2006 (Zhong, 2011). Moreover, Zhong (2011) hints that the average 
age of working adults rose considerably from about 40 in 1997 to 45 in 2006 as a direct result.  
For all these reasons, many authors, like Zhong (2011), agree that demographic change is found 
responsible for a significant part of the increases in inequality levels. 
He argued that the influence of population aging in income inequality is much greater in rural 
communities, mostly because of rural-to-urban migration and pension benefits. On the one side, 
migration to urban centres comprises mainly younger adults, and has thus increased the share 
of older individuals living in villages. This, as stressed by Eggleston et al. (2013), has posed a 
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dilemma about whether or how to reorganise the rural landscape to streamline governance and 
better provide public goods. Problems might probably emerge in urban areas too. Peng (2011) 
suggested that cities could absorb 335 million new residents in the next decades. This creates a 
paramount challenge for social and economic development – as rural dwellers migrate to cities, 
conventional problem-solving capacities soon become obsolete, and concerns regarding social 
welfare, old-age support, health care, and conflict resolution begin to surface (Eggleston et al., 
2013). On the other hand, people working in urban areas are more likely to exit the labour force 
before attaining the official retirement age, mostly because of the pension system’s structure. 
Pensions mitigate the repercussions of the exit from the labour market over household income, 
but not all Chinese inhabitants are able to enjoy such privilege (Zhong, 2011). Urban dwellers 
are generally granted pension benefits, but rural old people may be unable to get them. Hence, 
they usually must work hard and start saving money when they are young (Wang et al., 2017).  
Wang (2010) emphasised that the unbalanced population represents in itself a significant crisis, 
since its arrival is imminent and inevitable, its ramifications are huge and long-lasting, and its 
effects will be hard to reverse. An increasingly aging population can lower the share of working-
age population, which in turn could create a labour shortage. Some experts allege that a lack of 
manpower can contribute to slower economic growth by means of raised wages and by forcing 
the government to bear the costly upgrading of the state’s industrial structure (Eggleston et al., 
2013). It is also worth noting, as highlighted by Eggleston et al. (2013), that population aging 
can likewise imperil financial and social stability and deeply alter China’s traditional methods 
of governance when interacting with both gender imbalance and rapid urbanisation. Given that 
demographic change can eventually have a considerable impact in the economic, political, and 
social context, further policy action should be devoted to effectively address this phenomenon. 
 
3. The Effect of Poverty and Inequality on Economic Growth 
Prominent academics and intellectuals have recently begun to re-focus attention on the impact 
of poverty and inequality on economic development. Some argue that these phenomena act as 
a constraint on growth, and that policymakers must inevitably face a trade-off between equity 
and efficiency – improving the distribution of income and achieving sustainable development, 
they argue, are conflicting priorities. Others, conversely, claim that their influence is not robust 
enough to significantly impact the economic performance of a country. Thus far, the real effects 
of poverty and inequality on economic growth remain largely inconclusive. 
Throughout the 20th century, as highlighted by Leoni and Pollan (2003), authors had a greater 
propensity to think that equality is associated with economic costs, and that a certain degree of 
inequality favours economic progress. Keynes (1920) indicated that only the existence of richer 
classes provides for the capital accumulation needed to trigger growth, since they typically have 
a higher saving rate than poorer income groups. Notwithstanding, Kaldor (1956) pointed out 
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economic structure and industrializes but is no longer valid for advanced economies. Countries 
at this stage of development generally face a trade-off between equity and efficiency or, in other 
words, regarding whether to prioritise equal distribution or economic expansion (Okun, 1975). 
At present, nonetheless, there is an ongoing debate regarding the veracity of these assumptions, 
and numerous scholars advocate for a re-assessment of the economic conditions that influence 
growth dynamics. 
Breunig and Majeed (2020) developed a theory that can serve as a framework for understanding 
the interaction among poverty, inequality, and economic growth. They suggest that the adverse 
effects of disparities on growth are related to the incidence of poverty. If poverty rates are below 
30 percent, the relationship between inequality and economic rise is not significant. But, if they 
reach higher levels, inequality is believed to harm economic development. For this reason, they 
hold that policies aimed at alleviating poverty could be helpful to promote growth, even if they 
do not reduce disparities. Ravallion (2002), nonetheless, supports a different thesis. He argues 
that poverty indeed has a negative impact on progress – nations with a higher initial incidence 
of poverty, he asserts, generally tend to experience a lower subsequent rate of economic growth. 
On the issue of inequality, one of the most relevant theories is that developed by Nobel Laureate 
Michael Spence (2018). He affirms that growth strategies that lack inclusiveness and exacerbate 
inequalities are generally unsuccessful. Individuals who are adversely affected by such policies, 
including those who are not provided with sufficient opportunities, become increasingly more 
frustrated. As a result, social polarization emerges and eventually provokes political instability, 
gridlock, or short-sighted decision-making. Plans and investments to foster long-term growth 
are consequently scrapped, which hurts overall economic performance – economic and social 
progress should be simultaneously pursued. Notwithstanding, The Economist (2012) outlined 
that some measure of inequality is beneficial, as it offers incentives to work hard and take risks. 
Barro (1999) provides a different view on the matter. He contends that inequality tends to retard 
growth in impoverished countries but boosts development in richer ones. When per capita GDP 
falls below $2,000, growth tends to decline. When it exceeds this level, conversely, growth is 
higher. Income-equalizing policies, thus, are employed by poor nations to encourage economic 
expansion, but rather constitute the product of the aforementioned trade-off in the richest ones. 
In fact, Chinese official figures seem to partly support this claim. Per capita GDP in 2019 was 
¥70,892 ($9,905.82), and the country recorded a gradual and steady increase in total GDP over 
the 1979-2019 period despite the higher levels of inequality. However, it is also true that China 
has continuously registered smaller relative increases in total GDP since 2010 (except in 2017). 
In any case, a number of scholars agree that deciding which levels of inequality are desirable is 
strongly related to the theory of distributive justice, and that reducing this issue to the economic 
dimension can be extremely difficult. The relationship among poverty, inequality, and growth 
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The findings of the present study seem to partially confirm the working hypothesis that, despite 
bringing unprecedented economic development and prosperity, the Four Modernisations failed 
to strengthen social inclusion. Put another way, broad segments of society were left behind as 
a consequence of the particularities of the 1978 programme. The figures examined by this paper 
reveal that dwellings in urban settings, especially those located in coastal areas, have enjoyed 
higher increases in their per capita disposable incomes than those located in inland provinces 
and rural environments. As mentioned before, such disparities could possibly be the product of 
the policy specifics. Special Economic Zones (SEZs), for instance, rapidly became a powerful 
attraction pole for foreign investment and high technology equipment, stimulated commercial 
activity, and succeeded in boosting progress in the territories in which they were instituted. Not 
surprisingly, the vast majority of SEZs are located in south-eastern coastal China, the nowadays 
Eastern economic region. The administration expected a spillover effect, but it never actually 
materialised and a social gap was created among Chinese individuals. This is one of the factors 
that shaped the new patterns of growing inequality that were speculated at the start of this paper. 
Nevertheless, the theory posed by this academic document is not completely correct. In recent 
years, both the rural and inland zones have presented the highest relative increases in income. 
This is the result of the administration’s efforts to achieve a more harmonious development: it 
has implemented a number of measures to tackle this issue, some of which have been reviewed 
by this paper. Pro-farmer policies, such as the exemption from agricultural taxes and fees and 
the agricultural subsidies for farming households, were enacted as part of its sustainable growth 
strategy. Reasonable efforts have also been made in the expansion of the social security system, 
with the universalisation of the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme and the establishment 
of the New Rural Pension Scheme. In turn, regional development strategies and fiscal transfer 
policies have been enforced with the purpose of narrowing the regional gap, such as the Western 
Development Strategy. This set of actions has disrupted the tendency of the previous decades, 
so the initial hypothesis would consequently be partially rejected. 
In general terms, this document corroborated two major events. On the one hand, the economic 
reform considerably contributed to the reduction of absolute poverty in China. The proportion 
of people falling below the $1.90 international poverty line decreased from 66.2 percent in 1990 
to 0.5 percent in 2016. By the same token, the poverty gap declined from 24.1 percent in 1990 
to 0.1 percent in 2016, which means that individuals in a situation of extreme poverty have an 
income near $1.90 per day. On the other hand, nevertheless, the Four Modernisations resulted 
in a rise in the levels of inequality. The empirical research of Ravallion and Chen revealed that 
the Gini index was 30.95 shortly after the policy implementation, but the NBSC estimated it at 
46.8 in 2018. In addition, official figures appear to suggest that upper-middle-class and upper-
class households registered the greatest relative increases in the per capita disposable income 
over the considered time span. Several trends hidden within these data have also been examined. 
The rural-urban divide is undoubtedly the most significant phenomenon. The urban-rural ratio 
is currently reaching a level slightly above that of 1978 – it accounted for 2.57 and 2.69 in 1978 
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and 2018, respectively. Nonetheless, this indicator was above 3 during most of the last decade: 
per capita disposable incomes in urban environments were more than 3 times greater than those 
in rural settings. Furthermore, findings indicate that, over the 2013-18 period, the income of the 
lowest class rose more rapidly in the cities than in the countryside. That of the highest class, by 
contrast, grew at a faster pace in rural zones than in urban centres. Regional disparities are the 
second greatest factor contributing to overall income inequality in China. Data provided by the 
NBSC illustrates that per capita disposable incomes are higher in Eastern localities, which are 
followed by the North-Eastern, Central, and Western regions. In line with previous studies, this 
research paper also corroborated that the rural communities surrounding the most dynamic and 
competitive areas – mainly the coastal zones – have greatly benefitted from the spillover effect. 
The educational opportunities of disadvantaged pupils can similarly be mentioned as another 
issue of concern to Chinese society and are mainly the product of both the rural-urban divide 
and social stratification. First, the difference between rural and urban communities in terms of 
resource constraints exercises a marked influence on the local government’s ability to provide 
these services. Secondly, elite groups have historically employed education as a mechanism to 
maintain their class superiority and to pass the privileges of their class status over generations. 
In a similar vein, the demographic change is often considered as an additional factor responsible 
for the increased inequality levels – the notable socio-economic development, the diffusion of 
medical knowledge, and the 1997 one-child policy have led to an increasingly aging population 
that could ultimately cause considerable economic harm. 
A number of researchers and scholars agree that unsustainable levels of income inequality can 
eventually undermine the efficiency of the economy. For this reason, policy action is necessary 
to avoid its potential harmful effects on political, social, and economic stability. Jain-Chandra 
et al. (2018) have recommended further possible actions to address this problematic. They claim 
that fiscal policy could play a crucial role in alleviating poverty, and that tax reforms to boost 
inclusiveness (both on the tax and expenditure side) should be taken. For instance, they propose 
redesigning direct taxes and social security contributions and introducing property and wealth 
taxes to improve progressivity. Besides, they advocate for further public spending on areas such 
as education, health, and social assistance, together with increased equality on their provision. 
These policies would enhance social integration and would greatly contribute to the reduction 
of disparities, an important milestone also set by the UN Sustainable Development Goals 2030. 
Notwithstanding, the previously described scenario could be substantially altered by the present 
COVID-19 pandemic. As the first chapter of this thesis highlighted, it could impact commercial 
flows worldwide, in turn influencing Chinese GDP, by way of a reduction in both external and 
domestic demand. This generates a great deal of uncertainty, since a post-pandemic economic 
performance is hard to predict – trade, investments and population movements across borders 
could be notably reduced for a prolonged period of time. Decreased rates of economic growth 
could generate higher levels of inequality and social exclusion, hence modifying the indicators 
studied throughout this paper. Further attention and consideration must be devoted to this area. 
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Appendix A. General Trends on Poverty and Inequality. Data 
A.1. Gini Index, 1981–2018 
Year 
Source: 





1981 30.95   
1982 28.53   
1983 28.28   
1984 29.11   
1985 28.95   
1986 32.41   
1987 32.38   
1988 33.01   
1989 35.15   
1990 34.85 32.2  
1991 37.06   
1992 39.01   
1993 41.95   
1994 43.31   
1995 41.5   
1996 39.75 35.2  
1997 39.78   
1998 40.33   
1999 41.61 38.7  
2000 43.82   
2001 44.73   
2002  42  
2003   47.9 
2004   47.3 
2005  40.9 48.5 
2006   48.7 
2007   48.4 
2008  43 49.1 
2009   49 
2010  43.7 48.1 
2011  42.4 47.7 
2012  42.2 47.4 
2013  39.7 47.3 
2014  39.2 46.9 
2015  38.6 46.2 
2016  38.5 46.5 
2017   46.7 
2018   46.8 
A.2. Head-Count Ratio at $1.90 a Day, 1990–2016 
Source: World Bank 
A.3. Poverty Gap at $1.90 a Day, 1990–2016 
Source: World Bank 
Year Head-Count Ratio Year Poverty Gap 
1990 66.2 1990 24.1 
1993 56.6 1993 20.3 
1996 41.7 1996 12.9 
1999 40.2 1999 13.1 
2002 31.7 2002 10.1 
2005 18.5 2005 4.8 
2008 14.8 2008 3.9 
2010 11.2 2010 2.7 
2011 7.9 2011 1.8 
2012 6.5 2012 1.4 
2013 1.9 2013 0.4 
2014 1.4 2014 0.3 
2015 0.7 2015 0.2 


















Source: NBSC (¥), 2013–18 
2013 4402,4 9653.7 15698 24361.2 47456.6 
2014 4747,3 10887.4 17631 26937.4 50968 
2015 5221.2 11894 19320.1 29437.6 54543.5 
2016 5228.6 12898.9 20924.4 31990.4 59259.5 
2017 5958.4 13842.8 22495.3 34546.8 64934 
2018 6440.5 14360.5 23188.9 36471.4 70639.5 
Source: World Bank (%), 1990–2016 
1990 8.3 12.4 16.4 22.1 40.8 
1996 7.4 11.5 15.9 22.4 42.9 
1999 6.5 10.5 15.1 22.3 45.6 
2002 5.6 9.6 14.5 22.3 48 
2005 5.8 10.1 14.7 22.2 47.1 
2008 5.2 9.4 14.5 22.5 48.4 
2010 5.1 9.2 14.3 22.3 49 
2011 5.4 9.6 14.6 22.3 48.1 
2012 5.3 9.7 14.7 22.4 47.8 
2013 6.2 10.3 15 22.1 46.3 
2014 6.2 10.5 15.2 22.3 45.8 
2015 6.4 10.6 15.3 22.3 45.4 
2016 6.5 10.7 15.3 22.2 45.3 
A.5. Distribution of Income by Deciles (%), 1990–2016 
Source: World Bank 
Year Lowest Decile Highest Decile 
1990 3.5 25.8 
1996 3.1 27.3 
1999 2.7 29.5 
2002 2.3 31.3 
2005 2.4 30.8 
2008 2.1 32 
2010 2 32.6 
2011 2.1 31.8 
2012 2.1 31.5 
2013 2.5 30.3 
2014 2.5 29.7 
2015 2.6 29.4 
2016 2.7 29.3 
 
Appendix B. The Rural-Urban Divide. Data 
B.1. Rural and Urban Population (%), 1978–2018 
Source: NBSC 
Year Urban Population Rural Population 
1978 17.92 82.08 
1979 18.96 81.04 
1980 19.39 80.61 
1981 20.16 79.84 
1982 21.13 78.87 
1983 21.62 78.38 
1984 23.01 76.99 
1985 23.71 76.29 
1986 24.52 75.48 
1987 25.31 74.68 
1988 25.81 74.19 
1989 26.21 73.79 






1991 26.94 73.06 
1992 27.46 72.54 
1993 27.99 72.01 
1994 28.51 71.49 
1995 29.04 70.96 
1996 30.48 69.52 
1997 31.91 68.09 
1998 33.35 66.65 
1999 34.78 65.22 
2000 36.22 63.78 
2001 37.66 62.34 
2002 39.09 60.91 
2003 40.53 59.47 
2004 41.76 58.24 
2005 42.99 57.01 
2006 44.34 55.66 
2007 45.89 54.11 
2008 46.99 53.01 
2009 48.34 51.66 
2010 49.95 50.05 
2011 51.27 48.73 
2012 52.57 47.43 
2013 53.73 46.27 
2014 54.77 45.23 
2015 56.1 43.9 
2016 57.35 42.65 
2017 58.52 41.48 
2018 59.58 40.42 












1978 171.2 - 343.4 - 133.6 - 
1980 246.8 44.16 477.6 39.08 191.3 43.19 
1985 478.6 93.92 739.1 54.75 397.6 107.84 
1990 903.9 88.86 1510.2 104.33 686.3 72.61 
1995 2363.3 161.46 4283 183.60 1577.7 129.88 
2000 3721.3 57.46 6255.7 46.06 2282.1 44.65 
2001 4070.4 9.38 6824 9.08 2406.9 5.47 
2002 4531.6 11.33 7652.4 12.14 2528.9 5.07 
2003 5006.7 10.48 8405.5 9.84 2690.3 6.38 
2004 5660.9 13.07 9334.8 11.06 3026.6 12.50 
2005 6384.7 12.79 10382.3 11.22 3370.2 11.35 
2006 7228.8 13.22 11619.7 11.92 3731 10.71 
2007 8583.5 18.74 13602.5 17.06 4327 15.97 
2008 9956.5 16.00 15549.4 14.31 4998.8 15.53 
2009 10977.5 10.25 16900.5 8.69 5435.1 8.73 
2010 12519.5 14.05 18779.1 11.12 6272.4 15.41 
2011 14550.7 16.22 21426.9 14.10 7393.9 17.88 
2012 16509.5 13.46 24126.7 12.60 8389.3 13.46 
2013 18310.8 10.91 26467 9.70 9429.6 12.40 
2014 20167.1 10.14 28843.9 8.98 10488.9 11.23 
2015 21966.2 8.92 31194.8 8.15 11421.7 8.89 
2016 23821 8.44 33616.2 7.76 12363.4 8.24 
2017 25973.8 9.04 36396.2 8.27 13432.4 8.65 
2018 28228 8.68 39250.8 7.84 14617 8.82 
B.3. Urban-Rural Income Ratio, 1978–2018 
Source: NBSC 
Year Ratio Using 2019 Data Ratio Using 2017 Data 
1978 2.57 2.57 






1985 1.86 1.86 
1990 2.20 2.20 
1991  2.40 
1992  2.58 
1993  2.80 
1994  2.86 
1995 2.71 2.71 
1996  2.51 
1997  2.47 
1998  2.51 
1999  2.65 
2000 2.74 2.79 
2001 2.84 2.90 
2002 3.03 3.11 
2003 3.12 3.23 
2004 3.08 3.21 
2005 3.08 3.22 
2006 3.11 3.28 
2007 3.14 3.33 
2008 3.11 3.31 
2009 3.11 3.33 
2010 2.99 3.23 
2011 2.90 3.13 
2012 2.88 3.10 
2013 2.81 3.03 
2014 2.75 2.97 
2015 2.73 2.95 
2016 2.72  
2017 2.71  
2018 2.69  













2013 9895.9 17628.1 24172.9 32613.8 57762.1 
2014 11219.2 19650.5 26650.6 35631.2 61615 
2015 12230.9 21446.2 29105.2 38572.4 65082.2 
2016 13004.1 23054.9 31521.8 41805.6 70346.8 
2017 13723.1 24550.1 33781.3 45163.4 77097.2 
2018 14386.9 24856.5 35196.1 49173.5 84907.1 













2013 2877.9 5965.6 8438.3 11816 21323.7 
2014 2768.1 6604.4 9503.9 13449.2 23947.4 
2015 3085.6 7220.9 10310.6 14537.3 26013.9 
2016 3006.5 7827.7 11159.1 15727.4 28448 
2017 3301.9 8348.6 11978 16943.6 31299.3 
2018 3666.2 8508.5 12530.2 18051.5 34042.6 
 
Appendix C. The Inland-Coastal Gap. Data 











2013 38.2 26.6 27 8.1 






2015 38.3 26.6 27.1 8 
2016 38.4 26.6 27.1 7.9 
2017 38.4 26.6 27.2 7.8 
2018 38.5 26.6 27.2 7.8 











2013 51.2 20.2 20 8.6 
2014 51.2 20.3 20.2 8.4 
2015 51.6 20.3 20.1 8 
2016 52.6 20.6 20.1 6.7 
2017 52.9 20.8 19.9 6.4 
2018 52.6 21.1 20.1 6.2 











2013 23658.4 15263.9 13919 17893.1 
2014 25954 16867.7 15376.1 19604.4 
2015 28223.3 18442.1 16868.1 21008.4 
2016 30654.7 20006.2 18406.8 22351.5 
2017 33414 21833.6 20130.3 23900.5 
2018 36298.2 23798.3 21935.8 25543.2 











2013 31152.4 22664.7 22362.8 23507.2 
2014 33905.4 24733.3 24390.6 25578.9 
2015 36691.3 26809.6 26473.1 27399.6 
2016 39651 28879.3 28609.7 29045.1 
2017 42989.8 31293.8 30986.9 30959.5 
2018 46432.6 33803.2 33388.6 32993.7 











2013 11856.8 8983.2 7436.6 9761.5 
2014 13144.6 10011.1 8295 10802.1 
2015 14297.4 10919 9093.4 11490.1 
2016 15498.3 11794.3 9918.4 12274.6 
2017 16822.1 12805.8 10828.6 13115.8 
2018 18285.7 13954.1 11831.4 14080.4 
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